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“Life” in the Balance: Judicial Review
of Abortion Regulations
Khiara M. Bridges*
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, scholars have been
preoccupied with the test that ought to be applied to abortion regulations.
Debate has swirled around the question of whether laws that burden the
abortion right should be reviewed with strict scrutiny, rational basis
review, or some other multi-factor or categorical test and at what point
during pregnancy these tests are appropriate. Moreover, since Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, in which the Court replaced Roe’s trimester
framework with the undue burden standard, commentators have
questioned the propriety of this new test. This Article argues that the most
important change from Roe to the present has not been the test that the
Court has used to determine the constitutionality of abortion regulations,
but rather the Court’s departure from the position that Roe took with
regard to the moral status of the fetus. The Court in Roe either remained
agnostic on the question of the fetus’s moral status (the tack that the
majority proclaimed to take) or decided that the fetus was not an entity of
moral value (the tack that some commentators proclaim was actually
taken). In stark contrast, the present Court, as demonstrated by its
opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart, appears to have decided that the fetus is a
morally consequential entity — a “life.” Accordingly, this Article has four
goals. First, it aims to elaborate the notion of “life” — conceptualized as a
powerful socio-cultural idea that is not properly understood as equivalent
to biological life, insofar as “life” has moral consequence and the
protection and veneration of it is a moral imperative. Second, it aims to
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demonstrate that the undue burden standard is a balancing test, requiring
courts to weigh governmental interests against individual liberties. Third,
it aims to use the example of the undue burden standard to demonstrate
the general problem with balancing tests in constitutional law and the
need for a developed theory of governmental interests. Fourth and finally,
it aims to show that the effectiveness of any balancing test designed to
protect abortion rights — whether it is strict scrutiny, rational basis
review, or the undue burden standard — depends on the elements that the
Court plugs into the test. When the Court plugs “life” into a balancing test
— that is, when the Court weighs the state’s interest in protecting fetal
“life” against the woman’s liberty interest in obtaining an abortion — the
test is guaranteed to protect the abortion right ineffectively.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade,1 which famously
held that a woman enjoyed a fundamental right to terminate a
pregnancy, many scholars have been preoccupied with the test that
ought to be applied to abortion regulations. Debate has swirled around
the question of whether restrictions on abortion should be reviewed
with strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, rational basis review, or
some other multi-factor or categorical test and, moreover, at what
point in pregnancy these tests are appropriate. Further, since Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,2 in which the Court replaced Roe’s trimester
framework with the undue burden standard, commentators have
questioned the propriety of this new test for determining the
constitutionality of abortion regulations. These critics queried whether
the standard is or ought to be a form of intermediate scrutiny, noted
transformations in its application from case to case, argued that it has
operated as nothing more than a rational basis review, and articulated
methodologies for its use.
This Article contends that the most important change from Roe to
the present has not been the test that the Court has used when
reviewing abortion regulations, but rather the Court’s departure from
the position that Roe took with regard to the moral status of the fetus.
The Court in Roe either remained agnostic on the question of the
fetus’s moral status (the tack that the majority proclaimed to take) or
decided that the fetus was not an entity of moral value (the tack that
some commentators proclaim was actually taken). At present, and as
revealed by the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart (“Carhart II”),3
the Court appears to have decided that the fetus is a morally
consequential entity of the highest degree — a “life.”4
“Life,” as used in this Article, is a powerful socio-cultural notion
that is not properly recognized as synonymous with prosaic biological
1

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873-74 (1992).
3
See Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007).
4
This Article uses quotation marks around “life” when the term is used to signify
the “life” that has moral, theological, or spiritual significance. Quotation marks are
not used when the term is being use to signify the relatively morally neutral capacity
that all living biological organisms possess. The important distinctions between these
two types of life are discussed infra Part I.B.
2
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life insofar as “life” has the profoundest of moral consequences. This
Article argues that judicial treatment of the fetus as a “life” will defeat
a woman’s interest in terminating a pregnancy under all balancing
tests, including strict scrutiny. Essentially, the effectiveness of any
balancing test — whether it is strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny,
rational basis review, or the undue burden standard — depends on the
elements that the Court plugs into the test. When the Court plugs
“life” into the test and weighs the state’s interest in protecting fetal
“life” against the woman’s liberty interest in obtaining an abortion, the
test is guaranteed to be an ineffective protection of the abortion right.
The analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I gives a brief history of the
Court’s articulation of the trimester framework in Roe, its replacement
with the undue burden standard in Casey, and the wealth of attention
scholars have given to the question of what test is most appropriate for
adjudicating the constitutionality of abortion regulations. This Part
then explores the Court’s use of the undue burden standard over its
twenty-year tenure. It argues that the test has transformed over the
years. While the Court has always used the standard to identify and
strike down those regulations that operate as “substantial obstacles” in
a woman’s path to an abortion, the test changed insofar as the
standard now takes into account notions of fetal “life.” That is, Casey
is not properly understood as having accepted the proposition that the
fetus is a “life”; indeed, Casey rejected the opportunity to do so.
Moreover, that rejection was reflected in the way that the Court used
the undue burden standard, as the test was used to strike down the
spousal notification provision of the Pennsylvania law at issue.
Essentially, the Court held that the woman’s interest in obtaining an
abortion outweighed the state’s interest in protecting the fetus — a
holding that would be impossible if the fetus were conceptualized as a
“life.” However, the Court’s most recent use of the undue burden
standard in Carhart II, upholding a federal statute that proscribes a
particular method of performing second and third trimester abortions,
demonstrates a remarkable departure from Roe’s and Casey’s refusal to
accept that proposition of fetal “life.” The vocabulary and the imagery
that the Court uses when speaking of the fetus, as well as the
reasoning deployed in arriving at the conclusion that the proscription
of the abortion method at issue did not impose an undue burden on
the abortion right, makes it fairly obvious that the Court proceeded
from the assumption that the fetus is a morally-significant, profound,
vulnerable “life.”
Part II investigates what kind of constitutional test the undue
burden standard has demonstrated itself to be. Although some
scholars argue that the undue burden standard is not a balancing test,
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but rather an effects test wherein the reviewing court quantifies the
burden that a regulation places on the right, this Part concludes
otherwise. It understands the test as one that calls for a court to
balance the woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy against the state’s
interest in protecting the fetus. When, in any given instance, the state’s
interest in protecting the fetus outweighs the woman’s right to
terminate her pregnancy, an undue burden will not be found and the
regulation will be upheld. Alternatively, when the woman’s right to
terminate her pregnancy is found to outweigh the state’s interest in
protecting fetal life in a given instance, an undue burden will be found
and the regulation will be struck down as unconstitutional.
Having established the undue burden standard as a balancing test,
Part III next turns to the general problem of balancing tests — that is,
tests that are designed to balance individual rights and liberties against
governmental interests. This Part explores the questions that have
vexed scholars for decades: on what universal scale of values may
governmental interests be weighed against individual rights and
liberties? How may the Court arrive at the determination that a
proffered governmental interest is or is not sufficiently weighty to
defeat an individual right? This Part explores this issue in the context
of scholarship criticizing the absence of a theory concerning what
ought to constitute a compelling governmental interest sufficient to
survive strict scrutiny. This Part puts the discussion about this lack of
theory in conversation with the advent of fetal “life” and the
protection thereof as state interests. This Part concludes that the
protection of fetal “life” as a state interest underscores the need for a
developed theory of governmental interests, compelling or otherwise.
Part IV argues that when the protection of fetal “life” is a state
interest against which any individual right or liberty is weighed, it
most assuredly will be deemed weightier than that against which it is
balanced. Essentially, fetal “life” confounds all balancing tests, from the
undue burden standard to strict scrutiny. “Life,” as culturally
constructed, is such a weighty proposition — endowed, as it is, with
spiritual and theological significance — that it necessarily outweighs
any individual right. This Part contends that, for this reason and
others, “life” must be extracted from the analysis. A brief conclusion
follows.

1290

University of California, Davis
I.

[Vol. 46:1285

ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE AND FETAL “LIFE”
A. A Bit of Background: From Roe to Casey

In 1973, the Court announced what was to be one of its most
controversial, beloved, reviled, celebrated, and denounced decisions
— Roe v. Wade.5 Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion, which
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
properly interpreted to provide women with a fundamental right to
terminate a pregnancy,6 thus requiring courts to use strict scrutiny
when reviewing regulations that restricted abortion.7 However, the
state’s dual interests in protecting a woman’s health and protecting the
prenatal life that she sustains were in tension with the abortion right.8
Thus, Roe erected a structure for determining when during a woman’s
pregnancy those competing state interests become compelling and
could legitimately prevail over the woman’s fundamental right.9 This
was the trimester framework:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s
attending physician.

5

Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
Id. (arguing that “the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action” supported the right to privacy, which encompassed a
woman’s decision whether to undergo an abortion).
7
Although the Court never uses the phrase “strict scrutiny” when describing the
level of scrutiny reviewing courts should use when evaluating abortion regulations,
the Court calls the abortion right, and the right to privacy under which it is found,
“fundamental” and asserts that it can be abridged only by “compelling” state interests
— hallmarks of strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at 155; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 943-44 (3d ed. 2009) (explaining that the government cannot
infringe on “fundamental rights . . . unless strict scrutiny is met; that is, the
government’s action must be necessary to achieve a compelling purpose”).
8
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (arguing that the abortion right “is not absolute and is
subject to some limitations; and that at some point the state interests as to protection
of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant”).
9
The Court argued that the state’s interest in protecting women’s health becomes
compelling after the first trimester, when abortion entails more medical risks than
enduring labor and childbirth. See id. at 163. Further, the Court argued that the state’s
interest in protecting fetal life becomes compelling at the point of fetal viability, which
occurred at the tail end of the second trimester, “because the fetus then presumably
has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.” Id. For a discussion
of criticism about this particular announcement, see infra Part III.B.1.
6
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(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the
first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health
of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion
procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal
health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in
promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if
it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe abortion except where
it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother.10
Roe’s nineteen-year tenure as the law of the land was far from quiet.
While the decision had its fair share of supporters, it was also
vigorously critiqued. The loudest criticism from the academy was
concerned with the question of whether the Constitution actually
supported a fundamental right to an abortion.11 Related to this was the
question of what level of review was appropriate for laws that
regulated abortion.12 Disagreement about the answers to these
questions was as passionate as people’s feelings about abortion.
Moreover, Roe was constantly tested by state legislatures. Indeed,
the Court heard several cases that sought to challenge, limit, or
overrule the decision.13 However, it was not until Casey that Roe and
10

Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920, 935-36 (1973) (“What is frightening about Roe is that this superprotected right is not inferable from the language of the Constitution, the framers’
thinking respecting the specific problem in issue, any general value derivable from the
provisions they included, or the nation’s governmental structure.”).
12
See, e.g., id. at 928 (disputing that abortion regulations require something more
than a “baseline requirement of ‘rationality’”).
13
See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 522 (1989) (upholding a
Missouri law prohibiting abortions from being performed in public facilities,
prohibiting public employees from providing information regarding abortion, and
increasing the cost of abortion by requiring viability testing of fetuses that are twenty
weeks gestational age and older); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 764, 766 (1986) (striking down regulations requiring
“informed consent” as well as the filing of reports regarding abortions conducted in
the state that were to be made publicly available); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 435, 450 (1983) (invalidating “informed consent,”
waiting period, and hospitalization requirements); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
326-27 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal
Medicaid funds for even “medically necessary” abortions — excepting abortions
sought subsequent to incest or rape); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640-41, 643-44
(1979) (upholding a regulation requiring unmarried, pregnant minors to obtain
parental consent to their abortions or, alternatively, to demonstrate to a court during a
11
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its trimester framework were officially laid to rest.14 While Casey
reaffirmed Roe’s “essential holding,”15 it rejected Roe’s trimester
framework and replaced it with a new analytic for evaluating the
constitutionality of abortion regulations — the undue burden
standard.16 The undue burden standard requires reviewing courts to
determine whether a regulation places a “substantial obstacle” in a
woman’s path to an abortion prior to the viability of her fetus.17 Postviability abortions remain subject to proscription provided that
exceptions are made for abortions necessary to save the life or health
of the woman.18 The standard represented a plurality of the Court’s
dissatisfaction with states’ inability under the trimester framework to
protect the fetal life sustained by the woman.19 The standard was
judicial bypass procedure that they are either mature enough to make the decision on
their own or that abortion is in their best interests); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480
(1977) (upholding a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of Medicaid funds for
nontherapeutic abortions and finding that the prohibition, which effectively precluded
the most indigent women from exercising their abortion rights, was consistent with
the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 54 (1976) (striking down regulations requiring spousal consent for
married women’s abortions and prohibiting saline amniocentesis, which was the most
widely used method of performing second trimester abortions at the time).
14
Part of the reason why the Court professed to uphold the “essential holding” of
Roe was precisely because Roe’s reign as law of the land had been far from quiet, and
“to overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a
watershed decision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious
question.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992).
15
Id. at 846.
16
Id. at 876. A finding that a regulation is an “undue burden” on the abortion
right simply means that the law unconstitutionally places a “substantial obstacle” in
the woman’s path to an abortion. Id. at 877. Unfortunately, the decision offered very
little guidance to lower courts as to how they ought to arrive at the conclusion that a
law does or does not amount to a “substantial obstacle.” See Gillian K. Metzger,
Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025, 2027 (1994) (noting Casey’s “failure to provide
a systematic methodology by which to apply” the undue burden standard); Linda J.
Wharton, Susan Frietsche & Kathryn Kolbert, Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 323 (2006) (noting that
the plurality “stumbled in its efforts to adequately clarify the contours of the undue
burden standard”).
17
Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (“An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of
law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”).
18
Id. at 846 (confirming the necessity of a life and health exception for postviability abortions). However, the principle that abortion regulations must contain
exceptions to protect women’s health is weakened by Carhart II, which upheld the
federal PBA despite its lack of a health exception. See discussion infra Part I.B.4.
19
Casey, 505 U.S. at 873 (finding that “a necessary reconciliation of the liberty of
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designed to enable states to demonstrate respect for fetal life — and
encourage women to demonstrate this respect by carrying the fetus to
term — at all stages of a woman’s pregnancy.20
Casey and the undue burden standard’s tenure as the law of the
land, like Roe and the trimester framework, drew forth much
controversy and criticism.21 Moreover, while much disapproval comes
from the political right,22 a fair share of disapproval comes from the
political left, who are critical of the impotence that the undue burden
standard has demonstrated as protection of a woman’s right to
terminate a pregnancy.23 Indeed, the only abortion regulation that the
Court has used the undue burden standard to strike down was the
spousal notification provision at issue in Casey.24
Although the undue burden standard, when first articulated, was
never a particularly tough defender of the abortion right (by design or

the woman and the interest of the State in promoting prenatal life, require, in our
view, that we abandon the trimester framework as a rigid prohibition on all
previability regulation aimed at the protection of fetal life”).
20
See id. (noting that “the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the
pregnancy in protecting . . . the life of the fetus that may become a child”).
21
See Wharton et al., supra note 16, at 320-21 (noting that the Casey has been
challenged quite vigorously and that “[i]n the first four months of 2006 alone,
legislators in fourteen states proposed measures to ban virtually all abortion
procedures, and the South Dakota legislature passed, but voters rejected, the nation’s
first post-Casey abortion ban”).
22
See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914, 954-56 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that what qualifies as an “undue burden” “is a value judgment”
that “can not be demonstrated true or false by factual inquiry or legal reasoning,” and
concluding, twice, that “Casey must be overruled”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 985-87 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the undue burden standard is “unprincipled in origin,”
“hopelessly unworkable in practice,” and “ultimately standardless”).
23
See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, and the
Evisceration of Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 291 (2010)
(arguing that the undue burden test “has fostered extensive encroachments on
women’s personal privacy” and that Casey “opened the door to physical, familial, and
spiritual invasions of women’s privacy that serve little purpose but public shaming and
humiliation”); Linda J. Wharton, Roe at Thirty-Six and Beyond: Enhancing Protection
for Abortion Rights Through State Constitutions, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 469,
471 (2009) (arguing that the “undue burden standard has proven to be far less
protective of abortion rights than the Roe standard”).
24
In fairness, the Court did use the undue burden standard to strike down a
Nebraska “partial-birth” abortion ban that was quite similar to the federal version of
the ban at issue in Carhart II. See Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 945-46 (finding the Nebraska
statute unconstitutional). However, Carhart II arguably represents the overruling of
Carhart I sub silentio. If so, it remains true that the only abortion regulation that the
Court has used the undue burden standard to strike down is the spousal notification
provision at issue in Casey.
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by happenstance25), it is woefully anemic in its present incarnation.
Specifically, the Court has built notions of fetal “life” into the
standard. The next subpart explores this concept of fetal “life” and
explains how it differs from biological life. This Part goes on to trace
the Court’s conceptualization of the fetus’s moral status in Roe, Casey,
and Stenberg v. Carhart [“Carhart I”]. Part I concludes by
demonstrating that the Court in Carhart II conceptualized the fetus as
a representation of “life” and incorporated that understanding of the
fetus’s moral status into the undue burden standard — a striking
departure from the Court’s earlier understanding of the fetus and the
standard.
B. On “Life”
When a person asserts that abortion is wrong because the fetus is “a
life,” the “life” referenced needs no definition: upon hearing the
signifier, the hearer knows that what is being signified is distinct from
biological life and dutifully conjures up notions of a precious, sacred26
entity that must be revered, respected, and protected.27 “Life” is that to
which esteemed philosopher and legal academic Ronald Dworkin
refers when he writes: “[H]uman life has an intrinsic, innate value,
that human life is sacred just in itself; and that the sacred nature of a
human life begins when its biological life begins, even before the
25
Linda Wharton, Susan Frietsche, and Kathryn Kolbert, who represented the
plaintiff-reproductive health providers in Casey, have argued that the undue burden
standard was actually intended to be a tough defender of the abortion right; however,
its misapplication by lower courts has rendered it frail. See Wharton et al., supra note
16, at 319, 323 (arguing that the standard was meant to offer “meaningful protection”
of the abortion right and claiming that the plurality’s “passionate discussion of the
benefits that reproductive liberty had bestowed upon generations of women and their
prospects for full equality” buttress the notion that the plurality intended that the
standard provide substantial defense of the right); id. at 255 (arguing that lower courts
“have not been faithful to Casey’s promise”).
26
This Article insists that “life” ought to be understood as a secular concept,
although its origins may be in religion — analogous to the way that the assertion that
the fetus is a morally consequential entity ought to be understood as a secular
assertion, although many religions share the same view. See discussion infra note 188.
27
Borgmann has helpfully distinguished “thin” and “thick” conceptions of life. See
Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Meaning of ‘Life’: Belief and Reason in the Abortion Debate, 18
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 551, 557-58 (2009). She defines the “thin” conception of life
as referencing “the fact that a blastocyst, or embryo, or fetus, is a human organism
that is in the process of developing into a full person.” Id. at 592. Counterpoised to
this is the “thick” conception of life — a life that “carries a moral urgency and
legitimacy.” Id. at 597. Borgmann’s “thick” life corresponds to the “life” to which this
Article refers.
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creature whose life it is has movement or sensation or interests or
rights of its own.”28 “Life” is that to which people refer when they
describe life as a “supreme value”; it is that which is invoked when
people note the “sanctity of life,” the “dignity of life,” the “inherent
value” of life, the “intrinsic goodness” of life, “the intrinsic worth” of
life, the “infinite value” of life, and the “inviolability of life.”29
Yet, “life” acquires its power because it has no precise definition.30 It
is an abstraction without content; it means everything that those who
evoke it desire because it denotes nothing with precision.31 As
explained by historian Barbara Duden, “Life itself is not an amoeba
word, since it does not have any application as a technical term in
scientific discourse. Unlike zygote and fetus, it does not stem from the
language of a disciplinary thought collective. . . . [T]he semantic trap
into which the use of ‘a life’ leads is not due primarily to its ambiguity
but to its vapidity.”32
Any thorough account of “life” must mention its vulnerability.
“Life” is easily undervalued, frequently misrecognized, and cavalierly
destroyed; accordingly, it is in need of constant protection.33 Indeed,
28

RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 11 (1993).
29
GEOFFREY G. DRUTCHAS, IS LIFE SACRED? 3 (1998).
30
Many have attempted to define “life” with precision, however. See, e.g., Stephen
C. Hicks, The Right to Life in Law: The Embryo and Fetus, the Body and Soul, the Family
and Society, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 805, 826 (1992) (arguing that if “[life] cannot refer
to the species and does not refer to living beings, or to living a life, then it may refer to
God, the soul, or the spirit”).
31
Carol Sanger has done illuminating work tracing the popularization of “life”
within cultural discourse. See generally Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws:
Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 802 (2006) (observing the
work that the administration of George W. Bush accomplished in disseminating
notions of “life” through its campaign to create a “culture of life” in the United States).
32
BARBARA DUDEN, DISEMBODYING WOMEN: PERSPECTIVES ON PREGNANCY AND THE
UNBORN 75 (1993); cf. Borgmann, supra note 27, at 599 (noting the “vague” nature of
the signifier “life” and describing it as a “code word”); id. at 586 (describing “life” as
“slippery”). The “slipperiness” of life, as a word, is quite substantial. Thus, when
Bristol Palin titles her autobiography Not Afraid of Life, it is unclear whether she
means that she is not afraid of life in the sense of the series of frequently unexpected
events that occur to a person from birth to death. Alternatively, she may mean that she
is not afraid of life in the sense of “life” — the object of her unplanned pregnancy that
she carried to term while still a teenager and while her mother was the running mate
of Senator John McCain during his 2008 Presidential bid: “When the doctor laid Tripp
in my arms, I knew this baby was not a mistake. Having sex outside of marriage was
the mistake. But this baby? He was — and is — a blessing.” BRISTOL PALIN, NOT AFRAID
OF LIFE: MY JOURNEY SO FAR 153 (2011).
33
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S878-02, S880 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2005) (statement of
President George W. Bush) (“Because a society is measured by how it treats the weak
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part of the reason why “life” cannot be spoken about dispassionately is
because the protection of it — the work of convincing, or compelling,
others to defer to it — frequently means that the “liberty” of those
who do not recognize or believe in “life” is constrained.34 The contest
over abortion is frequently fought on this terrain.
Finally, it is important to note that “life” is distinct from “person”;
one may believe that the fetus is not a “person” in the constitutional
sense, yet remain convinced that a fetus is a “life” bearing the
weightiest of moral statuses.35 Due to the profound vulnerability of the
fetus, the gravity of its moral status as a non-”person,” a “life,” may be
thought to exceed the gravity of the moral status of the not always
vulnerable “person.” Indeed, Roe maintained the distinction between
fetal personhood and fetal moral status, arguing that the fetus is not a
“person” within the meaning of the Constitution, while shortly
thereafter arguing that it need not decide the difficult question of
when “life” begins.36
The next sections trace the Court’s understanding of the fetus’s
moral consequence in Roe, Casey, Carhart I, and Carhart II. The
discussion should demonstrate that, while the Court did not
apprehend the fetus as a “life” in the first three cases, Carhart II
represents a dramatic departure from this precedent. Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion reveals the Court’s unapologetic acceptance of fetal
“life.” Moreover, Carhart II’s apparent and unmistakable appreciation
of the fetus as “life” has profound consequences for the undue burden
standard, an argument that Part II begins to make.
1.

The Fetus in Roe

The Court in Roe went to great lengths to remain agnostic on the
question of the fetus’s moral status. While it definitively answered the
and vulnerable, we must strive to build a culture of life.”); George W. Bush, U.S.
President, Remarks at the Dedication of the Pope John Paul II Cultural Center, (Mar.
22, 2001), in 1 PUB. PAPERS 284 (“In the culture of life, we must make room for the
stranger. We must comfort the sick. We must care for the aged. We must welcome the
immigrant. We must teach our children to be gentle with one another. We must defend
in love the innocent child waiting to be born.”) (emphasis added).
34
Jennifer M. Miller, Understanding Fetal Pain: How Changed Circumstances
Demand a Legal Response, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 463, 494 (2006) (“If we recognize a fetus
as a ‘life,’ then the privacy right of the mother is eliminated from the equation, and the
fetus is worthy of protection.”).
35
Id. (noting that “a fetus, therefore, might not be a person in a formalistic sense,
but it is still a human being”).
36
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (noting that the Court does not need to
address the question of where life begins).
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question (in the negative) of whether the fetus was a “person” under
the United States Constitution,37 it did not similarly answer the
question of whether the fetus is a moral entity deserving of some
manner of deference. The Court professed not to answer this question,
attempting to create an abortion jurisprudence around an agnosticism
as to the fetus’s moral status.38
Roe owes much of its length to the Court’s history of thought
concerning the fetus39 — a history that leads the Court to conclude
that the fetus’s moral status has been, since time immemorial, the
subject of much debate and disagreement. In the face of thousands of
years marked by the failure of a moral consensus concerning the fetus
to develop, the Court refuses to ensconce one particular version of
fetal moral ontology into American constitutional law. The corollary
to this refusal is the Court forbidding individual states from
ensconcing one version into state law.40 Hence, we arrive at the
Court’s eloquent attestation of agnosticism: “We need not resolve the
difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are
unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the
development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as
to the answer.”41
However, some argue that the Court in Roe protested too much
about its desire not to answer the question about the fetus’s moral
status. These scholars contend that it did just that in prohibiting states
from proscribing abortion prior to fetal viability. For example, Michael
Sandel argues that, despite Roe’s protestations that it was being neutral
with respect to the fetus’s moral status, it implicitly decided that the
fetus was not an entity of moral consequence when it interpreted the
Constitution to provide for a right to an abortion.42 He contends that,
37
Id. at 158 (stating that the Court is persuaded that “the word ‘person,’ as used in
the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn”).
38
For a critique of the professed agnosticism of Roe and the more general position
that the constitutionality of abortion can be adjudicated without determining the
moral status of the fetus, see Borgmann, supra note 27, at 555-56 (concluding that the
moral question of the fetus must be answered in order to permit abortion).
39
Roe, 410 U.S. at 130-47 (discussing the wide divergence of thinking about the
fetus throughout history and noting the absence of a moral consensus in the U.S. on
the issue at the time of the decision).
40
Id. at 162 (“[W]e do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may
override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake.”).
41
Id. at 159.
42
See Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and
Homosexuality, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 532 (1989) (arguing that the Court did not

1298

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 46:1285

just as one has tacitly decided that the slave is not a “person” in the
constitutional sense when one permits slavery, analogously, one tacitly
decides that the fetus is not a morally-consequential entity when one
permits abortion.43 He concludes by stating the following: “That the
Court’s decision in Roe presupposes a particular answer to the
question it purports to bracket is no argument against its decision,
only an argument against its claim to have bracketed the controversial
question of when life begins. It does not replace Texas’s theory of life
with a neutral stance, but with a different theory of its own.”44
If Sandel and likeminded scholars45 are correct and Roe held, albeit
implicitly, that the fetus is not a morally consequential entity, then
Carhart II represents the most dramatic of departures from this
holding. This shift occurs because Carhart II not only holds (again,
implicitly) that the fetus is a morally consequential entity, but also
regards the fetus as a morally consequential entity of the highest
degree — a “life.”
2.

The Fetus in Casey

Casey represents the dissatisfaction that a plurality of the Court had
with the trimester framework and the way that it functioned to
prohibit the state from “show[ing] its concern for the life of the
unborn”46 in the earlier stages of a woman’s pregnancy. Indeed, Casey
is much more sympathetic than Roe to state legislators who believe in
“bracket” the question of when life begins, but rather implicitly answered that it did
not begin prior to viability).
43
See id. (making this analogy).
44
Id.
45
See, e.g., DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS 14 (2008) (“When life
begins and when it ends must necessarily be decided as a matter of constitutional
interpretation, because basic guarantees depend on it . . . . However much the Court
might want to avoid the question, or appear not to have to answer it, the definition of
life, at least at the margins, is a subject necessarily inherent in the meaning of certain
constitutional guarantees.”); John T. Noonan, Posner’s Problematics, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1768, 1772 n.24 (1998) (arguing that the Court’s “professed agnosticism as to when
life begins . . . is not a morally neutral position; it is a rejection of a fundamental
postulate of the law the decision holds unconstitutional”); see also Borgmann, supra
note 27, at 556 (“By purporting to leave the question for each individual to decide, the
Court has not dodged the question but rather has effectively rejected a belief in fetal
personhood, for if an embryo or fetus is a person, abortions must be prohibited, and
women who obtain abortions are as culpable as the doctors who perform them.”). It is
important to note that Borgmann conflates fetal personhood and the moral status of
the fetus. In contrast, this Article distinguishes the two concepts. See discussion supra
Part I.B.
46
Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992).
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the moral consequence of the fetus and believe abortion to be a moral
wrong that ought to be avoided at all costs. While Roe silenced those
legislators and tied their hands during the first two trimesters, Casey
made explicit provision for them to speak to the woman and attempt
to convince her that the decision that she endeavored to effect was a
grave error.
Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact
rules and regulations designed to encourage her to know that
there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that
can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to
full term and that there are procedures and institutions to
allow adoption of unwanted children as well as a certain
degree of state assistance if the mother chooses to raise the
child herself. The Constitution does not forbid a State or
city . . . from expressing a preference for normal
childbirth. . . . [This is] the inevitable consequence of our
holding that the State has an interest in protecting the life of
the unborn.47
While Casey is sympathetic to legislatures that subscribe to notions of
the moral consequence of the fetus, and even to fetal “life,” the Court
itself does not appear to be committed to those same ideas. The
language that the Court uses when speaking about the fetus is far from
evocative or passionate48 — much unlike the Court’s language in
Carhart II.49 Similarly, Casey uses no suggestive images — again, much
unlike the Court in Carhart II. The Casey Court appears to give
respectful deference to those who may be passionate about the fetus
and the “life” that it is believed to embody, while refusing to indicate
whether or not it shares those beliefs.50 The Court presents itself as a

47

Id. at 872-73 (citations omitted).
Arguably, the most intense language used in the opinion concerns the
vulnerability of the Court’s legitimacy should it not honor stare decisis in the case
before it. See id. (“A willing breach of [the promise to remain steadfast] would be
nothing less than a breach of faith . . . .”); id. at 868 (“Like the character of an
individual, the legitimacy of the Court must be earned over time . . . . The Court’s
concern with legitimacy is not for the sake of the Court, but for the sake of the Nation
to which it is responsible.”).
49
See discussion infra Part I.B.4.
50
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (stating that abortion is “an act fraught with
consequences for others,” including “society[,] which must confront the knowledge
that these procedures exist, procedures some deem short of an act of violence against
innocent human life; and, depending on one’s beliefs, for the life or potential life that
is aborted”).
48
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neutral arbiter called upon to broker a peace between warring factions,
declining to say whose side it thinks should win.51
One criticism that could be levied at this stage in the argument is to
observe that the Court in Casey used the newly established undue
burden standard to uphold four out of five provisions of the
Pennsylvania regulation under review. Does this holding not evidence
a Court that has accepted the fetus as a “life” and, consequently, is
partial to protecting it? This question must be answered in the
negative. The Court in Casey, undoubtedly, is partial to allowing
opponents of a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy the
opportunity to present their views. However, this permission is not
granted because the Court necessarily subscribes to those views and
wields the undue burden standard as a tool for vindicating them.
The provisions of the Pennsylvania law that were held to be
constitutional and that arguably evidenced a Court convinced of fetal
“life” are the parental consent requirements for minors52 and the
general informed consent requirements obliging women to hear
specific information (regarding the adoption alternative, the
availability of public assistance for indigent mothers, fathers’ child
support responsibilities, and the availability of state-authored
published materials describing the fetus).53 The parental consent
provision required that unemancipated minors obtain the consent of a
parent or guardian or, alternatively, demonstrate to a court pursuant
to a judicial bypass procedure that either she is mature enough to
make the abortion decision on her own or that the abortion is in her
best interests.54 It is true that a Court subscribing to the fetus as “life”
might uphold a parental consent requirement such as this,
understanding it as another useful obstacle to put in the path to an
abortion — an obstacle that may function as an absolute barrier to
abortion — and, in so doing, save the “life” of the fetus. But, the Court
51
Indeed, the Court expressly describes itself as a peacemaker. See id. at 867
(describing the task at hand as interpreting the Constitution in such a way as to bring
“the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division”).
52
Id. at 899-900.
53
Id. at 881. The other sections of the Pennsylvania law that were upheld in Casey
were a recordkeeping and reporting requirement (excepting a provision that was
inconsistent with the Court’s invalidation of the spousal notification requirement) as
well as a definition of those events that qualified as a “medical emergency,” thereby
making inapplicable the provisions requiring general informed consent and parental
consent. Id. at 880, 901. The fifth provision of the Pennsylvania law at issue, the
spousal notification requirement, was struck down as an undue burden on the
abortion right. Id. at 898.
54
Id. at 899.
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in Casey does not understand the requirement in this way (at least not
ostensibly so). Again, the Court’s discussion of the provision’s
constitutionality is notably devoid of a vocabulary demonstrating a
reverence and awe of the “life” that might be saved subsequent to a
minor’s consultation with an adult. Although it does nod to the
“values and moral or religious principles”55 of the minor’s family, it
simply looks to precedent and finds the Pennsylvania regulation
consistent with it.56
Similarly, it is true that a Court subscribing to the fetus as “life”
might uphold the general informed consent requirements found
constitutional in Casey, understanding them as an obstacle that may
function to save the “life” of the fetus. But, again, this is not how the
Court talks about the Pennsylvania regulation. Instead, the discussion
of the law is consistent with a Court that feels that those convinced of
fetal “life” were illegitimately and unfairly silenced under the Roe
framework and is now committed to allowing them an opportunity to
speak — even if their speech is designed to convince a woman to
continue her pregnancy.57 Like the disinterested mediator that it takes
itself to be, the Court does not show its cards on how it, if asked,
would answer the question of the fetus’s moral status.
This discussion does not argue that the Court’s disinterest translates
into a willingness to allow the state convinced of fetal “life” to say
anything to the woman. The Court notes that the materials that
Pennsylvania produced relate to abortion’s “consequences to the
fetus”58; it notes that the materials, which explore “fetal development,”
55

Id. at 900.
Id. at 899. Much scholarship has focused on the negative effects occasioned by
parental involvement statutes — specifically the requirement that pregnant minors
seek permission to obtain an abortion from a court if they cannot obtain permission
from their parents. See, e.g., Khiara M. Bridges, An Anthropological Meditation on Ex
Parte Anonymous: A Judicial Bypass Procedure for a Minor’s Abortion, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
215, 241-42 (2006) (arguing that judges assigned the task to grant or deny a judicial
waiver of parental consent requirements inevitably incorporate cultural assumptions
about gender, pregnancy, age, and emotion into their “readings” of a petitioning
minor’s testimony — an incorporation that has detrimental consequences for minors
whose subjective experiences are inconsistent with those cultural assumptions); Carol
Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse of Law,
18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 418 (2009) (“[B]ypass hearings serve less to evaluate
the quality of a young woman’s decision than to punish her for making it. The
hearings provide an opportunity to inflict a kind of legal harm — harm by process —
on young women seeking to abort.”).
57
Casey, 505 U.S. at 883 (noting that the information that the state gives women
via the informed consent process may express the state’s “preference for childbirth
over abortion”).
58
Id. at 882.
56
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are “truthful and not misleading”59 and are designed to force the
woman to consider the “effect on the fetus.”60 Notably, the materials
upheld say nothing explicit about the state’s views on the fetus’s moral
status. The information that Pennsylvania sought to give to women
might have caused some women to forego abortion because they
became convinced that the physical capacities possessed by their fetus
made it more like an infant than not, thereby making their abortion
more like infanticide than not. However, the information that
Pennsylvania sought to give women did not endeavor to accomplish
this same aim by expressly arguing that the fetus is a “life” and that
abortion is the immoral extermination of this “life.” Given Casey’s
description of the materials that it held to be constitutional, and given
its explicit directive that the materials be “truthful and nonmisleading”
in order to pass constitutional muster, it is far from obvious that the
Casey Court would reach the same conclusion about materials
explicitly avowing that the fetus is a “life.”61 That is, Casey offered an

59

Id. at 882-83.
Id. at 883; see also id. at 882 (overruling the holdings in Akron I and Thornburgh
because they found a “constitutional violation when the government requires, as it
does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the
procedure . . . and the ‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus”).
61
This is to argue that Casey says nothing about the constitutionality of the “new”
brand of informed consent to abortion statutes that attempt to dissuade women from
their decision to terminate their pregnancies by presenting as fact specific arguments
about the fetus’s moral status. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02 (2010)
(requiring that women be told as part of the informed consent process that their
abortion will “terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being”);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2010) (same). These laws are problematic because
of the moral coercion they attempt to accomplish under the guise of respecting
women’s autonomy as rational decisionmakers. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion,
Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications of Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading
Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. 1, 27 (2008) (noting the “inappropriate emotional influence”
that the “new” informed consent statutes can have); cf. Caroline Mala Corbin, The
First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 1010-11
(2009) (“[T]he mandatory morals lecture discredits a woman’s ability to make adult
decisions by assuming she has not adequately thought through the moral
repercussions and cannot do so without state intervention. In other words, the insult
to agency is not that the state will succeed in changing the woman’s mind, but the
very fact that it tries.”). There is a serious question as to whether the information
given qualifies as “truthful and nonmisleading.” See Blumenthal, supra, at 27 (noting
that the information given under the “new” informed consent statute might be
misleading because they take “advantage of emotional influence to bias an individual’s
decision away from the decision that would be made in a non-emotional, fully
informed state”); Corbin, supra, at 1008-11 (arguing that the information states
attempt to give women under the “new” informed consent statutes is frequently
“misleading, if not inaccurate”).
60
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undue burden standard that would give those certain of fetal “life” an
opportunity to speak, not an opportunity to make moral arguments.
However, it may be unlikely that a Court convinced of fetal “life”
would prohibit states from attempting to convince pregnant women
that they carry “life” and ought not to terminate it.
The Court also upheld the Pennsylvania informed consent
regulation’s requirement of a twenty-four hour waiting period.62
Again, Casey’s discussion of the provision hardly evidences a Court
committed to protecting fetal “life.” The Court concedes that the
waiting period may have the effect of “protecting the life of the
unborn” by dissuading women from undergoing abortion.63 But, this
protection is a consequence of the woman having had time to reflect
on the physical capacities that her fetus possesses, the possibility of
giving the infant up for adoption, her eligibility for state assistance for
indigent mothers if she carried the pregnancy to term, and the child
support obligations that her fetus-cum-infant’s father has to provide64
— not because the waiting period makes extremely difficult or
downright impossible a woman’s attempt to effectuate her decision to
abort. The Court, blissfully unaware that it is writing the plurality’s
class privilege into constitutional law, goes to some length to deny
that the waiting period would have the practical effect of making
abortion substantially more difficult for anybody.65 This is not a Court
motivated by a moral imperative to save fetal “life”; this is a Court that
is blind to the fact that there is “another world out there”66 in which

62

Casey, 505 U.S. at 887.
Id. at 885.
64
Id. (noting that the waiting period allows the woman’s decision to be more
“informed and deliberate” as a “period of reflection” will follow the woman’s receipt of
information encouraging her to carry the pregnancy to term).
65
Id. at 886-87 (disagreeing with the district court’s finding that the waiting
period must be struck down because it will be “particularly burdensome” on some
groups of women, noting that “[a] particular burden is not of necessity a substantial
obstacle,” and denying that the waiting period is a substantial obstacle for even those
women who experience it as “particularly burdensome”). Of course, the district court
did not know that the magic words that would signal unconstitutionality were
“substantial obstacle,” as it handed down its findings on the effect that the waiting
period would have on indigent women well before the Court would make a finding of
a “substantial obstacle” synonymous with unconstitutionality.
66
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 348-49 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(writing that the Court’s refusal to strike down the Hyde Amendment shows that
“there truly is another world out there, the existence of which the Court . . . either
chooses to ignore or fears to recognize”) (quotations omitted).
63
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the increase in costs occasioned by a twenty-four hour waiting period
are experienced not as “slight,”67 but rather as tragic.
The most telling evidence that the Court in Casey does not wield the
undue burden standard as a tool for effecting a moral imperative to
save fetal “life” at all costs is the fact that Casey struck down
Pennsylvania’s spousal notification provision, a provision that the
Court notes might have saved fetal “life” at the expense of the
autonomy of women in abusive relationships with their male
partners.68 If the undue burden standard is a balancing test, which this
Article argues in Part II, then the Court found that the abortion right
of the woman involved in a relationship marred by domestic violence
outweighed the state’s interest in protecting prenatal life. This result is
impossible if the prenatal life is taken to be “life” since “life,” by virtue
of its profundity and vulnerability, functions to outweigh anything
against which it is balanced.
The Court in Casey, like the Court in Roe, did not conceptualize the
fetus as “life.” This judicial appreciation of the fetus continues in
Carhart I, but it is abandoned quite dramatically in Carhart II. The
discussion of Carhart I below should bring into greater relief just how
much of a departure Carhart II is from the Court’s pre-2007
jurisprudence of fetal life.
3.

The Fetus in Carhart I

In Carhart I, the Court was called upon to determine the
constitutionality of a Nebraska statute that criminalized the dilation
and extraction abortion procedure, or D&X.69 The Court struck down
the regulation because it lacked a health exception and because the
language of the law could also be read to proscribe the most
commonly-used method of performing second and third trimester
abortions (dilation and evacuation, or standard D&E).70
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion is consistent with Casey’s directive
that the Court ought to be a dispassionate arbiter — the broker of a
67

Casey, 505 U.S. at 901.
Id. at 888-95 (citing the lower courts, amici briefs, and other studies
demonstrating that the spousal notification provision would prevent women in violent
relationships with their husbands from obtaining the abortion they desire).
69
Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914, 914 (2003). During the D&X
procedure, which is interchangeable with the intact dilation and extraction procedure
(“intact D&E”), the physician removes the fetus largely intact from the uterus. Id. at
927-28. The D&X is to be counterpoised to the standard D&E procedure, during which
the physician dismembers the fetus as it is removed from the uterus. Id. at 924-26.
70
Id. at 930.
68
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compromise — in the nation’s war between those who support
abortion rights and those who abhor them.71 The opinion begins with
a conciliatory overture, giving voice to the standpoints of both sides of
the abortion debate: “Millions of Americans believe that life begins at
conception and consequently that an abortion is akin to causing the
death of an innocent child . . . . Other millions fear that a law that
forbids abortion would condemn many American women to lives that
lack dignity [and] depriv[e] them of equal liberty. . . .”72 Like Casey,
the Court takes itself to be the institution that must strike the
compromise between these (seemingly) fundamentally incompatible
worldviews. It declares that it only strikes down the law after it has
“tak[en] account of these virtually irreconcilable points of view, aware
that constitutional law must govern a society whose different members
sincerely hold directly opposing views, and considering the matter in
light of the Constitution’s guarantees of fundamental liberty.”73
Like Casey, the Court appears sympathetic to those who believe in
fetal “life.”74 However, consistent with Casey, and as expected of a
Court that takes itself to be a mediator between two sides engaged in a
pitched war, it does not itself appear to be committed to those same
ideas.75 Nor does it appear to be committed to a position that denies
that the fetus, which the Court refers to as “potential human life,”76
has any moral consequence. In fact, the Court appears ambivalent
about the fetus’s moral status, vacillating between conceptualizing the
fetus as morally analogous to an infant on the one hand and morally
analogous to any living, biological organism on the other. Indeed, in
the same section that describes the fetus as being composed of “friable
tissue” that is not “easily broken” and must be subject to

71
In his dissent, Justice Scalia seems to rejoice in the seemingly apparent fact that
Casey and the undue burden standard have been unable to broker a truce between
both sides of the abortion debate. See id. at 955-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting,
because he was “in an I-told-you-so mood,” his previous prediction in his dissent in
Casey that the decision would be unable to be an effective compromise).
72
Id. at 920 (majority opinion).
73
Id. at 920-21.
74
It notes, for example, that its description of the procedure at issue in the case
may be “clinically cold or callous to some, perhaps horrifying to others.” Id. at 923.
75
And in that lack of commitment to fetal “life,” the Court may be accused of
disbelieving the existence of fetal “life.” Such a result is expected when the conflict is
constructed as a Manichean one within which there is no middle ground.
76
Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 923; see also id. at 930 (referring to the “potentiality of
human life”).
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“dismemberment or other destructive procedures,” the fetus is also
described as moving through, not the “vagina,” but the “birth canal.”77
The majority’s hesitant treatment of the fetus stands in relatively
stark contrast to the way that other Justices would describe it.
Consider Justice Scalia, who appears committed to the fetus’s intense
moral consequence. In his dissent, Scalia refers to the fetus as “halfborn posterity,”78 the procedure at issue as a “live-birth abortion” that
would “destroy[] the child,”79 and the law that would proscribe the
procedure as “humane” and “anti-barbarian.”80 Yet, Scalia’s
commitment to the fetus is more extensively (and dramatically)
articulated by Justice Kennedy. Indeed, Kennedy plainly formulates
the abortion debate and the views that may be held about the fetus as
Manichean, and he interprets Casey as allowing states to do what is
“right”: “States may take sides in the abortion debate and come down
on the side of life, even life in the unborn.”81 For Kennedy, the life that
the fetus embodies possesses a “sanctity”82; indeed, it has an “intrinsic
value” that many “decent and civilized people” recognize.83 Although
there are those who will be “insensitive, even disdainful,”84 to it, the
fetus is nevertheless entitled to “dignity and respect.”85 Which is to
say, in Kennedy’s opinion, the fetus is clearly a “life” — profound,
sacred, vulnerable, and desperately in need of protection. In Carhart
II, Justice Kennedy convinces four other Justices to agree with him and
his conceptualization of “life,” as he writes the majority opinion in
that discourse-changing decision.
4.

“Life” in Carhart II

As noted above, Carhart II upheld the federal Partial Birth Abortion
Ban Act (“PBA”), which criminalized the D&X (or intact D&E)
technique of performing second- and third-trimester abortions.86 The
Court upheld the statute, despite its lack of a health exception87 (and
77

Id. at 925.
Id. at 953 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79
Id. at 954.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
82
Id. at 965.
83
Id. at 979.
84
Id. at 961.
85
Id. at 963.
86
For an explanation of the procedure and its relationship to standard D&E, see
supra note 69.
87
See Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 162-63 (2007) (upholding
78
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despite the fact that the Court had struck down just four years earlier
a similar bill in Carhart I), on the theory that it furthered the
government’s interest in “protecting the life of the fetus that may
become a child”88 — a legitimate governmental pursuit per Casey’s
explicit directive.89
Had the ban functioned to substantially constrain a woman’s ability
to terminate her pregnancy during her second trimester (prior to fetal
viability) or terminate a pregnancy that threatened her life or health90
during her third trimester (after the fetus reached viability), the Court,
consistent with Casey, would have had to strike down the ban as an
undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion. However, because of
the availability of other methods of abortion — that is, because
women would be able to obtain an abortion despite the ban — the
Court found that a ban on the D&X procedure did not function to
constrain substantially a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion during
those stages of her pregnancy.91 Accordingly, the federal PBA does not
the ban despite the lack of a health exception based on the fact that Congress found
that there was disagreement among physicians as to whether an intact D&E was ever
safer than standard D&E). Moreover, “[m]edical uncertainty does not foreclose the
exercise of legislative power.” Id. at 164.
88
Id. at 146 (emphasis added); cf. id. at 145 (noting that the government has a
“legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life”).
89
Carhart II has been roundly denounced among proponents of the abortion
right. See Laura J. Tepich, Gonzales v. Carhart: The Partial Termination of the Right to
Choose, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 339, 382 (2008) (“This new standard becomes even more
troubling . . . when one realizes how far it strays from the precedent established in
Casey . . . . While claiming to use the undue-burden standard in Carhart, Justice
Kennedy in fact employs rational-basis review . . . .”); see, e.g., Cynthia D. Lockett, The
Beginning of the End: The Diminished Abortion Right Following Carhart and Planned
Parenthood, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 337, 337-38 (2008) (suggesting that Carhart
will lead to the reversal of Roe v. Wade); Martha K. Plante, “Protecting” Women’s
Health: How Gonzales v. Carhart Endangers Women’s Health and Women’s Equal Right
to Personhood Under the Constitution, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 389, 389
(2007) (arguing that “Carhart diminishes the rights extended in Roe v. Wade so
significantly that it suggests a de facto overruling of Roe is imminent”); Sonia M. Suter,
The “Repugnance” Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other Theories of Reproductive
Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1514,
1569 (2008) (arguing that Carhart represents “an attempt to strengthen the Court’s
weighting of the state’s interest in potential human life, which may one day uphold a
ban of previable abortions”).
90
Whether the ban will function to threaten a woman’s health is subject to much
debate within the medical community — a dissension that persuaded the majority to
uphold the ban in spite of its lack of a health exception. See supra note 87.
91
See Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the
availability of other abortion methods saves the ban from unconstitutionality). The
most obvious alternative method is the standard D&E; however, other alternative
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“protect” fetal life if “protection” means preventing abortions, a fact
that the dissent notes.92
So, either the undue burden standard does not require the courts to
inquire into whether a regulation actually accomplishes the goal of
“protecting” fetal life (by preventing abortion), or the Court does not
take “protection” of fetal life to mean the “prevention” of abortion.
The opinion suggests the latter: Congress appeared to be concerned
with the intangible, cultural effects of the intact D&E procedure.
Congress argued — and the Court accepted — that the D&X
procedure would “coarsen” society, creating a culture within which
the most brutal degradations of human life are tolerated.93 The fear
was that D&X procedure would normalize brutality. As such, the
protection of fetal life under Carhart II may be accomplished entirely
discursively — by making, or remaking, culture.94
In this way, Carhart II’s suggestion that the government’s interest in
protecting fetal life may be achieved by entirely discursive work
represents a departure from previous understandings of how this
interest may be achieved. Casey suggests that fetal life is protected
when abortion is prevented. Accordingly, the principal aim of the
government pursuing this interest is not to create a society wherein
human life in all of its various stages of development is respected.
Instead, the principal aim of the government pursuing this interest is
to prevent women from terminating their pregnancies. Consider

methods are hysterotomy, by which the fetus is removed from the uterus via cesarean
section, and hysterectomy, by which the entire uterus is removed from the woman. Id.
at 140 (majority opinion).
92
Id. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Act scarcely furthers that interest
[in protecting the life of the fetus that may become a child]: The law saves not a single
fetus from destruction . . . .”); see also Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914,
930 (2003) (“The Nebraska law, of course, does not directly further an interest ‘in the
potentiality of human life’ by saving the fetus in question from destruction, as it
regulates only a method of performing abortion.”) (emphasis in original).
93
See Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 157 (“Implicitly approving such a brutal and
inhumane procedure by choosing not to prohibit it will further coarsen society to the
humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent human life, making it
increasingly difficult to protect such life.”) (quoting Congressional Findings).
94
In his dissent in Carhart I, Kennedy made plain his belief that the state’s interest
in the protection of fetal “life” is accomplished by making culture. Responding
directly to the claim that because the ban on D&X did not prevent abortion, it did not
further the state’s interest in protecting fetal “life,” Kennedy argued that it was
sufficient that the ban merely “instructed” society on the value of “life.” See Carhart I,
530 U.S. at 964 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“By its regulation, Nebraska instructs all
participants in the abortion process, including the mother, of its moral judgment that
all life, including life of the unborn, is to be respected.”).
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Casey’s discussion of the Pennsylvania informed consent provision95:
the Court did not uphold the regulation because of the discursive,
cultural work accomplished by the information attempting to dissuade
women from abortion. Rather, it upheld the regulation because the
information “might cause the woman to choose childbirth over
abortion”96 — in other words, it might prevent abortion. The Court
offered a similar justification for upholding the waiting period, finding
that it was “a reasonable measure to implement the State’s interest in
protecting the life of the unborn” insofar as it offered a period of
reflection within which women could contemplate the pros and cons
of undergoing an abortion.97 Again, the Court does not uphold the
waiting period because it creates a discourse or empowers an alreadyexisting discourse within which the dignity of human life is
appreciated and underscored. Instead, the Court upholds the
provision, despite the burden it would impose on the most vulnerable
women seeking to exercise their abortion right,98 because it may
prevent abortion. Thus, Carhart II represents a departure from Casey
insofar as Carhart II accepts discursive, culture-building work as a
proper aim of the state interested in protecting fetal life. However, this
is not the largest difference between the two opinions.
Rather, the most dramatic departure between Carhart II and Casey is
the conceptualization of the fetus. Indeed, one of the most blatant and
unapologetic aspects about the Court’s opinion in Carhart II is that it
takes the fetus to be an entity deserving of the most profound respect
— a “life.” That the fetus is much more than a biological entity
sustained by the woman through biological processes is suggested by:
the “womb”99 in which it resides prenatally; the “profound respect”100
that states may show it; and the “profound” “anguish,” “sorrow,”
“grief,” and “regret”101 that women feel post-abortion. It is important
95
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-87 (1992)
(discussing the informed consent provisions of the Pennsylvania law).
96
Id. at 883.
97
Id. at 885.
98
Id. at 886 (accepting the District Court’s findings that the waiting period will be
“particularly burdensome” for “those women who have the fewest financial resources,
those who must travel long distances, and those who have difficulty explaining their
whereabouts to husbands, employers, or others”).
99
Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007) (stating that “a fetus
is a living organism while within the womb, whether or not it is viable outside the
womb”).
100
Id. at 157 (arguing that “[t]he government may use its voice and its regulatory
authority to show its profound respect for the life within the woman”).
101
Id. at 159-60 (“It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to
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to note that these are women who, but for their frequently uninformed
actions,102 will develop a “bond of love” with their fetus-cum-infant
that represents the apotheosis of “respect for human life.”103
At certain points in the majority opinion, it may seem as though the
Court is proceeding from a different premise about the fetus, accepting
the fetus as no more and no less than a biological entity — a living
organism, but hardly a “life.” Indeed, the Court occasionally describes
the fetus “scientifically,” as when it notes “by common understanding
and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within
the womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb.”104 However,
this ostensible “scientific” contemplation of the fetus is in tension with
the Court’s other clear contemplation of the fetus: the “womb”dwelling entity triggering “profound respect,” “profound grief,”
“anguish,” and “sorrow.”105 Accordingly, even when the Court indexes
the unchallenged biological fact of fetal life, it means morally-salient
fetal “life.” In so doing, the Court quite seamlessly attaches moral
“life” onto biological life — performing on a smaller scale the larger
cultural processes that have made the biological fact of fetal life
simultaneous to the moral fact of fetal “life.”106 As Duden explains,
modernity has taken the fetus, an object from natural science, and
invested it with moral and spiritual significance; the fetus has been
invested with “life.”107 This imbuement is precisely what the majority
does in Carhart II.
So, the question for the Carhart II majority is not whether
constitutional protection ought to be afforded to a specific technique
of ending fetal biological life. The question that the majority is
adjudicating is whether to afford constitutional protection to a
procedure that ends — intentionally and, by most accounts, brutally
— a “life.” Unsurprisingly, the Court answered in the negative. It is
certainly true that the Court is quite concerned with the appearance of
the D&X procedure; the fact that it looks to be a “normal” childbirth
abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she
learns, only after the event, what she did not once know . . . .”).
102
See id. at 159 (arguing that some doctors would choose not to tell women
contemplating abortion exactly what the procedure entails because of the doctors’
concern with the women’s already fragile emotional state).
103
Id. (arguing that “[r]espect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the
bond of love the mother has for her child”).
104
Id. at 147.
105
Id. at 157-60.
106
For a discussion of the cultural processes that have made biological life
concomitant to moral life, see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
107
DUDEN, supra note 32, at 21.
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until the physician collapses the fetus’s skull disturbs the majority.108
While the Court is appalled by the aesthetics of the procedure, it is
difficult to conclude that the Court would have reached a different
result even had the procedure been less aesthetically displeasing.
Which is to say, within the logic of “life,” there is no acceptable
method to end it. As such, the slippery slope constructed by Carhart II
is not that the logic of the majority opinion supports the
constitutionality of criminalizing other abortion procedures, namely
the standard D&E procedure.109 Instead, the slippery slope is that the
Court has accepted “life” as the object of the abortion procedure, an
entity that can never appropriately be terminated.
This Part attempted to demonstrate that Carhart II represents a
radical departure from precedent insofar as it accepted the fetus as a
“life.” The next Part begins to determine the significance that this
conceptualization of the fetus has on the undue burden standard. That
analysis must begin with an inquiry into what kind of test the undue
burden standard has revealed itself to be.
II.

THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD: AN EFFECTS TEST, A BALANCING
TEST . . . OR BOTH?

So, what kind of test is the undue burden standard? Is it a balancing
test — weighing the government’s interests against the rights of the
individual — or something different entirely? Moreover, if it is a
balancing test, what level of review is it? Is it an intermediate review
that requires courts to determine whether a state’s important interest
outweighs the individual’s liberty interest in abortion? Or is it just a
glorified rational review that requires courts to determine whether a
state’s legitimate interest outweighs the individual’s liberty? Scholars
have arrived at different answers to these questions, in part because
Casey did very little to explain the standard and how courts should
use it. However, the least controversial description of the undue
burden standard is that it is not strict scrutiny. Casey completely
abandoned the rhetoric of “narrowly tailored” regulations designed to
further “compelling governmental interests” — telltale signs of strict
scrutiny110 — and replaced it with language concerning the
108
Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 160 (contending that intact D&E “perverts a process
during which life is brought into the world”) (quoting Congressional Findings).
109
Cf. Ronald Turner, Gonzales v. Carhart and the Court’s “Women’s Regret”
Rationale, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 41-42 (2008) (describing the standard D&E
procedure as equally “brutal” and “gruesome”).
110
Although Casey abandoned the rhetoric of strict scrutiny, some scholars argue
that Casey did not abandon the conceptualization of the abortion right as
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government’s “legitimate interests” (emphasis added)111 and telling
silence about the required “narrow” fit between means and ends.112
While it is easy to arrive at the conclusion that the undue burden
standard is not strict scrutiny, it is harder to arrive at the conclusion of
what exactly the standard is. There are several possibilities to the latter
question.
A. The Undue Burden Standard as Litmus Test for an Infringement of a
Right?
The undue burden test could be nothing more than an inquiry into
whether a regulation has actually infringed a right. Professor Alan
Brownstein has elaborated this argument. He writes that the undue
burden standard obliges courts to interrogate whether a regulation
actually constitutes an infringement of the individual fundamental
right — an inquiry that is usually subordinated to interrogations into
whether a constitutionally protected individual right/interest exists or
whether a state interest justifiably infringes it.113 Brownstein
fundamental. As such, they argue that the abortion right is an anomaly within
constitutional law insofar as it is a fundamental right that is not protected by strict
scrutiny. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 988 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing Casey as holding that “a law which directly regulates
a fundamental right will not be found to violate the Constitution unless it imposes an
‘undue burden’” and arguing that, as a result of weakening the level of review that
protects fundamental rights, the plurality shows a “willingness to place all
constitutional rights at risk in an effort to preserve what they deem the ‘central
holding in Roe’”) (emphasis in original); A Woman’s Choice — East Side Clinic v.
Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing the post-Casey abortion right
as “fundamental”); Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 259 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Abortion is
recognized as a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also Valerie J. Pacer, Salvaging the Undue Burden
Standard — Is It a Lost Cause? The Undue Burden Standard and Fundamental Rights
Analysis, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 295, 313 (1995) (“The undue burden standard, however,
subtly undermines the protective barrier surrounding any fundamental right. It allows
the current political majority to actively interfere with its citizens’ exercise of their
fundamental rights, so long as such interference does not amount to an undue burden.
Because it allows such interference, the undue burden standard appears irreconcilable
with traditional fundamental rights protection.”).
111
Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (reaffirming the proposition “that the State has legitimate
interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and
the life of the fetus that may become a child”).
112
See Metzger, supra note 16, at 2032 (noting that after Casey, a “restriction on
pre-viability abortions no longer needs to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
interest”).
113
See Alan Brownstein, How Rights are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden
Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 870 (1994) (arguing that,
usually, “the question of what constitutes an infringement of a right is treated as a
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understands an undue burden as a determination that the regulation
actually infringes the abortion right. The alternative — that the
regulation is a constitutional, due burden — is a determination that
the law infringes nothing.114
However, if the undue burden standard simply tests whether a
regulation infringes the abortion right as a fundamental right, then a
finding of an undue burden should not result in the regulation’s
unconstitutionality, as it currently does. Instead, a finding of an undue
burden-qua-infringement should result in the application of strict
scrutiny and an inquiry into whether the state has a compelling
interest in infringing the right.115 Because this is not how the undue
burden standard functions, it is inaccurate to describe it as merely a
test of the presence or absence of an infringement.
B. The Undue Burden Standard as an Effects Test?
The undue burden standard could be an effects test. As such, it
would require a reviewing court to gauge a regulation’s effect on the
ability of a woman to access abortion.116 If the court determines that
the path to abortion remains substantially clear, it may arrive at the
conclusion that the regulation is constitutional. Alternatively, if the
court determines that the regulation has placed a substantial obstacle
in the path to abortion, it must conclude that the regulation is
secondary concern,” but the undue burden standard elevates this question to a
primary concern).
114
See id. at 879-81.
115
This was how the undue burden standard functioned when it first appeared in
abortion jurisprudence. The “undue burden” language made an early appearance in
the abortion funding cases, which established the principle that the government did
not infringe indigent women’s abortion rights by prohibiting the use of Medicaid
funds to help pay the costs of an abortion. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314
(1980) (stating that Roe “protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference
with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy”) (quoting Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977)); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977)
(same). However, “undue burden” as a standard of review did not appear in abortion
jurisprudence until Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983). In Akron, the finding of an “undue
burden” did not mean that the regulation was unconstitutional; instead, it only meant
that the court then had to review the regulation under strict scrutiny. See id. at 463
(“The ‘undue burden’ required in the abortion cases represents the required threshold
inquiry that must be conducted before this Court can require a State to justify its
legislative actions under the exacting ‘compelling state interest’ standard.”). Moreover,
“undue burden” was not synonymous with “substantial obstacle,” but rather “absolute
obstacle[] or severe limitation[].” Id. at 463-64.
116
See Metzger, supra note 16, at 2034 (arguing that the “undue burden standard
only analyzes the quantity of burdens imposed”).
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unconstitutional. Notably, under this formulation of the standard, it is
not a balancing test, as it does not require a court to balance the state’s
interest in regulating abortion (i.e., in order to protect the woman’s
health or to protect fetal life) against the woman’s right to abortion.
Instead, the court need only calculate the effect that the law will have
on abortion access.
At first blush, describing the undue burden standard as an effects
test seems to fly in the face of the language used in the Casey joint
opinion, which suggested that courts must consider legislative
purposes and effects when reviewing an abortion regulation.117
However, the Supreme Court and most lower courts have refused to
analyze abortion regulations’ purposes as separate from their effects.118
Moreover, the Court’s opinion in Mazurek v. Armstrong119 indicated
the Court’s awareness of the possibility of disarticulating legislative
purposes from legislative effects, as well as its skepticism about the
possibility:
[E]ven assuming . . . that a legislative purpose to interfere with
the constitutionally protected right to abortion without the
effect of interfering with that right . . . could render the . . . law
invalid[,] there is no basis for finding a vitiating legislative
purpose here. We do not assume unconstitutional legislative
intent even when statutes produce harmful results . . . ; much
less do we assume it when the results are harmless.120
The pessimism of this language, coupled with the fact that the Court
has yet to engage in a robust analysis of legislative purposes, suggests
that the “purpose prong” of the undue burden standard has fallen by

117
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (“An
undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect
is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the
fetus attains viability.”); see also Brownstein, supra note 113, at 881-82 (“Any fair
reading of the language of the joint opinion . . . demonstrates that the ‘undue burden’
standard does not simply require a reviewing court to evaluate the magnitude of the
burden to determine if it is sufficiently heavy to be undue. Rather, the plurality is
proposing a fluid and complex analysis in which both the purpose and the effect of the
challenged law must be considered to determine if it is constitutional.”).
118
See Wharton et al., supra note 16, at 377-78 (“Lower courts have tended to omit
discussion of the purpose prong or to conflate it with the effects prong.”).
119
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 971 (1997) (per curiam); Note, After
Ayotte: The Need to Defend Abortion Rights with Renewed “Purpose”, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2552, 2566 (2006).
120
Mazarek, 520 U.S. at 972 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
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the wayside.121 All that is left is an inquiry into effects. Accordingly,
the standard may be properly described as an effects test.
But, here is the twist: even if the test only purports to require courts
to interrogate the quantity of the burden imposed by a regulation —
that is, its effects — this may not accurately describe the process by
which a reviewing court arrives at a determination about the quantity
of a burden. Differently stated, the undue burden standard could
incorporate balancing into what purports to be an effects test.
Although Casey did not explicitly charge lower courts with the task of
“balancing” the state’s interests against the right, liberty, or interests of
the woman,122 this is the most accurate description of the test. Which
is to say: balancing is implicit in the undue burden standard insofar as
a reviewing court, when deciding how much of a burden a law
imposes (in other words, its effects), balances the significance of the
woman’s abortion right/liberty against the state’s interest. Essentially,
courts engage in intuitive balancing.
C. Balancing as a Part of Testing Effects
Professor Stephen Gottlieb’s scholarship provides an instructive
place to begin laying the contours of this argument. He has argued
that many constitutional tests that appear to eschew balancing actually
incorporate balancing; accordingly, ostensibly non-balancing tests
frequently operate as a pretext for balancing.123 He argues that the
Court appears to lay down a categorical rule in Herrera v. Collins,
which held that constitutional guarantees of due process and freedom
from cruel and unusual punishment did not entitle a person sentenced
to death to a hearing on evidence suggesting his/her innocence when
121
Cf. Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914, 1008 n.19 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Justice Ginsburg’s Stenberg concurrence “seems to suggest
that even if the Nebraska statute does not impose an undue burden on women seeking
abortions, the statute is unconstitutional because it has purpose of imposing an undue
burden. . . . Justice Ginsburg’s presumption is . . . squarely inconsistent . . . with our
opinion in Mazurek v. Armstrong.”) (emphasis in original).
122
The Court does speak about the need for the reviewing court to “weigh” state
interests against individual interests; however, it only does this in reference to Roe’s
requirements. See Casey 505 U.S. at 853 (“The extent to which the legislature of the
States might act to outweigh the interests of the woman in choosing to terminate her
pregnancy was a subject of debate both in Roe itself and in decisions following it.”); id.
at 871 (“The Roe Court recognized the State’s ‘important and legitimate interest in
protecting the potentiality of human life.’ The weight to be given this state interest,
not the strength of the woman’s interest, was the difficult question faced in Roe.”).
123
Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Balancing Significant Interests, 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 825, 832 (1994) [hereinafter Balancing Significant Interests].
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this evidence is discovered after the trial and when there was no
“independent constitutional violation” in the earlier trial.124 In the
Court’s observation that “the passage of time only diminishes the
reliability of criminal adjudications,”125 Gottlieb argues that the Court
here makes it clear that it is not only aware of, but is also sympathetic
to, an argument about the government’s interest in the finality of
convictions.126 Gottlieb contends that the Court takes this
governmental interest and implicitly balances it against the
individual’s due process and Eighth Amendment rights to a hearing on
new evidence.127 The rule against post-conviction hearings on
potentially exonerative evidence is the result of this intuitive balance.
Essentially, in order to arrive at what looks like a categorical rule
against post-conviction hearings on potentially exonerative evidence,
the Court balances individual rights and governmental interests,
ultimately finding that the latter outweighs the former. “The Herrera
decision looks like a rule. But the Court’s discussion of finality made
sufficiently clear its resort to balancing. . . . It wrote as if this were a
categorical decision. . . . The categorization is a balancing act in
masquerade.”128
Gottlieb’s reading of Herrera is instructive insofar as it demonstrates
that judicial determinations appearing to have nothing to do with
balancing may be nonetheless a product of intuitive or implicit
balances.129 Indeed, the distinction between balancing and other
adjudicative methods may be that the former articulates the values
being balanced, while the latter allows those same values to go
unarticulated.130 With this difference in mind, it may obscure actual
judicial processes to claim that judges merely quantify the burden that
a regulation imposes in order to arrive at a decision that a law under
review is or is not an undue burden on the abortion right. A more
accurate description of this adjudicative process may be to state that
judges intuitively balance the governmental interest that the
regulation promotes against the woman’s right to/interest in
124

See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
Id. at 403.
126
Gottlieb, Balancing Significant Interests, supra note 123, at 831.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 831-32.
129
Cf. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 77-80 (2001)
(noting that types of constitutional tests — such as purpose tests, effects tests,
balancing tests, etc. — may be combined in practice, albeit implicitly).
130
Gottlieb, Balancing Significant Interests, supra note 123, at 836 (“[T]he
difference between balancing and categorization has to do with which values are made
explicit and which are left as unarticulated judgments.”).
125

2013]

“Life” in the Balance

1317

terminating her pregnancy. If this description is correct, then there is
the danger — especially subsequent to the Court’s decision in Carhart
II — that judges will balance the state’s interest in protecting fetal
“life” against the woman’s abortion right. If those are truly the
elements being balanced, then it is highly likely that judges will
frequently arrive at the determination that the “quantity” of the
burden that a regulation imposes does not amount to an
unconstitutional undue burden, as protecting “life” will invariably
outweigh an individual right/liberty interest in abortion.
It is not necessary to argue that Gottlieb’s description of adjudicative
processes is correct in every case. Moreover, it is unwarranted to claim
that judges always and necessarily engage in balancing when arriving
at all of their determinations, including the categorical and effectsbased ones. However, Gottlieb’s theory does indeed accurately
describe what is happening in the context of abortion.131 The Court
has given legislatures express permission to consider fetal “life” when
regulating. It should be unsurprising, then, that the Court (and lower
courts) would consider fetal “life” and its relative weight against the
woman’s right or liberty when determining whether the regulation has
surpassed an unarticulated level of burdensomeness.
Accordingly, the undue burden standard is a balancing test — albeit
an implicit one. Thus, when a reviewing court determines that a
regulation does not amount to an unconstitutional undue burden, the
court essentially has found that the state’s interest outweighs the
individual’s right. Conversely, when a reviewing court (infrequently)
determines that a regulation is an unconstitutional undue burden on
131
It is worth noting the abundance of jurists and scholars who have made this
argument — that effects tests often involve balancing — in other contexts. See, e.g.,
Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club v. Dep’t. of Health & Soc. Servs., 387 N.W.2d 254,
282 (Wis. 1986) (Steinmetz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that
the majority’s “direct and immediate effect” test is, in essence, “a balancing test to
determine whether the statewide benefits outweigh the effect of the legislation on
local or private interests”); Charles Fried, Types, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 55, 57-8 (1997)
(arguing that balancing is implicit in effects tests because, “as a logical matter[,] most
courses of action have some tendency to contribute to a forbidden effect” and,
consequently “an effects test must be cabined or qualified somehow: either by some
categorical rule . . . or by a balancing test that allows the forbidden effect to be
outweighed by the good that the questioned measure accomplishes”); Amit M.
Schejter & Moran Yemini, “Eyes Have They, but They See Not”: Israeli Election Laws,
Freedom of Expression, and the Need for Transparent Speech, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 411,
444 (2009) (“At the end of the day, the dominant effect test was not much more than
an ad hoc balancing test . . . .”); Alan Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The
Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 701-04 (1968) (showing how there is
balancing involved in classic establishment clause cases despite the fact that the test is
focused on the purpose or effect of a law).
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the abortion right, the court essentially has found that the individual’s
right/liberty outweighs the state’s interest.132
This is precisely what one court observed about an undue burden
standard that arises in a context unconnected to abortion. In Medina v.
Pacheco, the court was asked to review a jury instruction in order to
determine whether it had focused the jury on the relevant inquiry.133
The jury was instructed that it should decide whether the state’s
removal of the appellant’s children from their home “constituted an
undue burden on the Plaintiffs’ right to intimate familial relations.”134
The court noted that the instruction’s “undue burden” language comes
from case law, in which courts determine whether a plaintiff’s familial
association rights have been violated by applying “a balancing test
weighing the state’s interests in protecting children against the family
member’s interests in his or her familial right of association. . . .
Examining the parties’ interests in light of the facts of the case, we
weigh those interests to determine whether the state official’s conduct
constitutes an ‘undue burden’ on the family member’s rights.”135
Fascinatingly, the appellants argued that the “undue burden” language
did not adequately instruct the jury about the necessity of balancing
competing interests:
132
When courts engage in balancing, they may balance the whole right against the
whole state interest. However, courts generally are given more structure for the
balancing. For example, a test may require that courts balance the magnitude of the
infringement on the right against the state’s specific gain. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s
Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (“Accordingly, when evaluating a contentneutral injunction, we think that our standard time, place, and manner analysis is not
sufficiently rigorous. We must ask instead whether the challenged provisions of the
injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government
interest.”); cf. Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: What Are They and When
Should They Be Accommodated?, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 47, 64 (2010) (“Although
‘substantial burden’ and ‘compelling interest-least restrictive means’ are cast as
independent measures, courts inevitably do a kind of balance, considering the
government’s interest in conjunction with the degree of burden.”). Accordingly, with
respect to the undue burden standard, one could argue that when an undue burden is
not found, a court has determined that the state’s specific gain (that is, the extent to
which fetal “life” is protected) outweighs the burden on the woman’s right to access
abortion. Alternatively, when an undue burden is found, a court has determined that
the burden on the woman’s right to abortion outweighs the state’s specific gain.
Because of the weightiness of “life,” it may be that whenever the state manages to
protect fetal “life” — no matter how microscopic the protection — it will be found to
outweigh the burden on the woman’s right to abortion. Hence, the failure of courts to
find undue burdens on the abortion right.
133
Medina v. Pacheco, No. 97-2013, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22533, at *4 (10th Cir.
Sept. 14, 1998).
134
Id. at *10.
135
Id. at *11 (citation omitted).
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They suggest the “undue burden” test eliminates any sense of
balancing — that it led the jury to focus on whether the
officers’ actions were intrusive without also considering the
Medinas’ equally important protected family interest. Without
an explicit reference to the counterbalancing interest, they
argue, the instruction failed to give the jury any frame of
reference for determining exactly what might be “undue.” . . .
[W]e must disagree with the Medinas. The word “undue”
connotes the balancing test required because it only has meaning
in the context of weighing one thing against another. One cannot
determine if some action was due or undue without
considering the circumstances. . . . Because the competing
interests at stake were fairly obvious — the instruction
establishes the Medinas had a right to intimate familial
association entitled to constitutional protection — and the
word “undue” requires a balancing analysis, we do not have
substantial doubt whether this instruction led the jury to
conduct the required balancing test.136
Similarly, in P.J. v. Utah, a district court explicitly observed that the
“undue burden test” does not merely require a reviewing court to
quantify the burden imposed by an action in order to determine
whether it is undue. Instead, it requires a reviewing court to “balance
the plaintiff’s right to familial association against the relevant interests
of the state, considering the ‘severity of the alleged infringement, the
need for the defendant’s conduct, and any possible alternatives.’”137
Indeed, balancing is implicit in the undue burden standard. The
next Part considers the implications of this.
III. MAKING UP STUFF: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, GOVERNMENTAL
INTERESTS, AND THE SCALE THAT BALANCES THEM
Constitutional law scholar T. Alexander Aleinikoff has offered a
highly influential meditation on the nature, and problem, of balancing
tests within constitutional law.138 He distinguishes the Court’s present
136

Id. at *12-13 (emphasis added).
P.J. v. Utah, No. 2:05-CV-739 TS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72334, at *51 (C.D.
Utah Sept. 22, 2008) (citations omitted), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. P.J. v.
Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2010).
138
See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987) (asserting that while a “balancing operation” may be an
inevitable part of any legal system, there are extreme dangers in a balancing approach
that is overly simplistic).
137
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inclination to submit most constitutional contests to balancing from
an earlier time when Justices resolved contests with a more categorical
approach.139 During this bygone era, Justices took the task before them
as determining the kind of interests that were in competition, not the
relative weight of the interests.140 The disposition of the case was
determined by the Court’s characterization of the event that was the
subject of the dispute.141 He writes, “Marshall did not hold for the
Bank in McCulloch v. Maryland because the burden of the state’s tax
outweighed the state’s interest in taxation. Webster’s argument in
Gibbons v. Ogden was not persuasive because he demonstrated that the
interest of the national government outweighed the interests of the
states in regulating interstate commerce.”142 Instead of balancing the
contending interests, the Court declared categorical rules: “The power
to tax was the power to destroy; states could exercise police power but
could not regulate commerce . . . .”143
Aleinikoff argues that constitutional law in the age of balancing is
quite different from the earlier period of adjudication by
categorization. Moreover, his point is to argue that balancing is quite
deficient for a variety of reasons.144 He observes that balancing
provides a pretense of scientific objectivity to the act of judging145 —
an act which is frequently, if not always, a profoundly subjective
enterprise. Judges, like scientists, appear to place interests on an
objective scale. Decisions are to be taken as merely announcements of
the results of the procedure.146 However, the patina of scientific
objectivity is illusory; subjectivity remains the engine of constitutional
decision-making. Further, Aleinikoff contends that the language of
science may alienate us from what are, ultimately, intensely

139

Id. at 949.
Id.
141
See id. at 945.
142
Id. at 949.
143
Id.
144
There are many defenders of balancing, however. Gottlieb is one, arguing that
“balancing is an inherent aspect of any form of functional jurisprudence.” Stephen E.
Gottlieb, Introduction: Overriding Public Values, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1-5 (Stephen E. Gottlieb, ed., 1993) [hereinafter Public Values] (emphasis added).
But see Aleinikoff, supra note 138, at 1001-03 (stating that “balancing is not
inevitable” and maintaining that “[a]lthough balancing has spread through
constitutional law, many constitutional cases are decided each Term in non-balancing
ways”).
145
See Aleinikoff, supra note 138, at 992-93 (noting that balancing only appears to
be a ‘scientific’ method of adjudication).
146
See id. at 993 (making this argument).
140
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philosophical questions about what kind of society we want to be and
to create.147 Moreover, balancing is deficient because of the danger
that, should the Court allow balancing to continue its slow infiltration
into all corners of constitutional law, constitutional theory will lose its
distinctiveness. It will become no more than and no different from
argumentation over what is better social policy.148 However,
Aleinikoff’s most trenchant critique of balancing as a constitutional
adjudicatory method concerns the “problem of evaluation and
comparison”149 of competing interests. The next section explores this
dilemma.
A. The “Problem” of Governmental Interests
Most scholars have turned their critical attention to the “problem”
of rights. Their concern has largely been whether the Court has
correctly or incorrectly concluded that the Constitution supports (or
fails to support) a particular individual substantive right.150 However, a
smaller contingent has adjusted their focus to the question of
governmental interests.151 These scholars, with a special interest in the
“compelling” variety of state interests, have historicized the concept,152
criticized the language of “compelling state interests,”153 queried how
long the language and analytic might be used within constitutional

147

See id. (making this argument).
See id. at 992 (making this argument).
149
Id. at 972.
150
See, e.g., Ely, supra note 11, at 943 (concluding that the Court incorrectly
concluded that the Constitution supports a right to abortion).
151
Gottlieb has observed that calling them “governmental interests” is a misnomer,
as the interests of a government suggest “graft, corruption, honoraria, high salaries,
and burgeoning bureaucracies . . . .” See Gottlieb, Public Values, supra note 144, at 7.
He argues that a better term may be “compelling public purposes,” which suggests
that the government is acting on behalf on the people. See id.
152
See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests and
Constitutional Discourse, 55 ALB. L. REV. 549, 549-50 (1991–1992) [hereinafter
Constitutional Discourse] (noting that the notion of a “compelling state interest” has its
predecessor in the doctrine of “necessity,” which the Founders conceptualized as
enabling the needs of the community to trump and constrain the exercise of
individual needs).
153
See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Tiers of Scrutiny — From Strict Through Rational
Bases — and the Future of Interests: Commentary on Fiss and Linde, 55 ALB. L. REV. 745,
748 (1991–1992) (“The Court, however, invented the mumbo jumbo of compelling
state interests, so we have these conferences on compelling state interests because that
is the way they talk — not because it makes particularly good sense to talk that
way.”).
148
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law,154 and noted tensions in the way that the Court has used the
concept.155
In truth, inquiries about the legitimacy of rights and the legitimacy
of governmental interests might be related, as individual rights and
governmental interests may be conceptually interdependent.156 Not
infrequently, individual rights are defined with specific relation to and
in express consideration of government power.157 Indeed, rights have
often arisen because of worries about governmental power: “[A]nxiety
about abuse of power generates rights.”158 State power is that which
traces the borders of the individual right and delimits its reach — not,
as frequently imagined, another individual right.159
As it concerns this Article, this scholarship has generated especially
interesting insights about the absence of a theory of governmental
interests in constitutional law.160 While the test is clear — individual
154
See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, Shell Game of Interest Scrutiny: Who Must Know What,
When, and How, 55 ALB. L. REV. 725, 733 (1991–1992) (predicting that the language of
governmental interests would pass out of the constitutional vocabulary upon the
retirement of Justices Brennan and Marshall).
155
See id. (arguing that when an interest that is deemed “compelling” in one state
is not pursued in another state, the notion that the interest is “compelling” for any
jurisdiction is undermined); see also Gottlieb, Constitutional Discourse, supra note 152,
at 554 (describing compelling interests as “discretionary”).
156
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Power of Government, 27 GA.
L. REV. 343, 361 (1993) (describing this interdependence). But see David L. Faigman,
Measuring Constitutionality Transactionally, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 756 (1993–1994)
(arguing that government power and individual rights must be defined independent of
one another and that it would be “illegitimate to define individual liberty by virtue of
the majority’s reasons for acting”).
157
See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 156, at 361 (“The right is not defined by some
process independent of and external to consideration of the sensible scope of
government powers.”).
158
Id. at 365.
159
See id. at 362 (observing that the “conceptual limit of the constitutional right is
not . . . another right, but a power of government, supported and identified by
reference to underlying interests”).
160
See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85
CALIF. L. REV. 297, 326 (1997) (“[T]he current doctrine simply does not explain how
legislative ends are to be evaluated, beyond describing the requirements that they be
‘legitimate,’ ‘important,’ or ‘compelling.’ . . . [T]he current doctrine and tiers were not
really designed with scrutiny of governmental purposes in mind . . .”); Fallon, supra
note 156, at 350 (“Controversy surrounds the identification of unenumerated rights,
but until recently at least, there has been little similar worry about government
interests.”); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 941 (1988)
[hereinafter Compelling Governmental Interests] (“A survey of the governmental
interests identified by both the full Court and its individual members in separate
opinions indicates that such interests are subject to the same criticisms as
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rights and liberties may be abridged when the government can proffer
an interest substantial enough to justify the abridgment161 — it is
unclear by what principles the Court may arrive at the conclusion that
a proffered governmental interest is such that it may justifiably
infringe a right. The question, then, is two-fold: (1) how may the
Court deduce that a proffered state interest is legitimate?; and (2) how
may the Court assign weight to that interest such that it may be
balanced against a right? In its failure to articulate the principles by
which it decides the existence and magnitude of state interests, the
Court has been accused of being unprincipled in this regard.162
With respect to the first question concerning the principles by
which the Court can deduce that a state interest is a legitimate one,
the question would be moot if the Court could just look to the text of
the Constitution for an itemization of proper interests that the
government may pursue via exercises of its power. However, such an
itemization does not exist, although some scholars have made
attempts at providing one.163 Moreover, even if there were an
itemization within the Constitution, some legislator or jurist would
invariably argue that the itemization was not exhaustive and that
extra-textual interests exist as well. Accordingly, it is likely that state
interests must have non-textual sources.164 However, what are these
fundamental rights: their sources are ambiguous and their relative weights impossible
to gauge.”).
161
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958) (noting
that in order for the government to abridge the exercise of a constitutionally protected
right, “subordinating interest of the State must be compelling”) (quoting Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
162
See Aleinikoff, supra note 138, at 982 (arguing that the weights of state interests
“are asserted, not argued for”); Bhagwat, supra note 160, at 319 (“Across the
spectrum, however, one central theme emerges from the literature: there is a need for
a principled theory of permissible and compelling governmental purposes, and the
Supreme Court has failed to articulate such a theory.”); Fallon, supra note 156, at 350
(“[T]he derivation of government interests from the Constitution is notoriously loose
and easy.”); Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests, supra note 160, at 937
(“[T]he Court’s treatment of governmental interests has become largely intuitive, a
kind of ‘know it when I see it’ approach similar to Justice Stewart’s explanation of
pornography.”).
163
See, e.g., Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests, supra note 160, at 941-63
(providing and analyzing an itemization of compelling governmental interests).
164
See Gottlieb, Constitutional Discourse, supra note 152, at 553-54 (taking note of
an argument about whether governmental interests “should be understood as defined
by the Constitution or by some extratextual source” and affirming his belief in the
latter); see also Levinson, supra note 153, at 758 (noting an argument about whether
interests are textual or nontextual and concluding that that there is “a fairly strong
majority for the latter view” among the constitutional law scholars present at the
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sources? And what are the processes by which interests are derived
from these sources? Indeed, what is the source of the state’s interest in
protecting fetal “life”? Is this the same source of the state’s interest in
protecting the prosaic, biological life of the fetus? Just as the
Constitution makes no explicit mention of the right to abortion, it
makes no explicit mention of the state’s interest in protecting life or
“life.”165
With respect to the second question regarding the difficulty of
balancing individual rights against governmental interests (once
derived), the gravamen of the objection is that, in order to balance a
right against an interest, the judge must use a scale by which
ordinarily incomparable concerns can be compared. The origin of this
scale is the vexing issue. It must not be that the personal preference of
the Justice who authors the majority opinion is the “scale”; such an
occasion would threaten to turn constitutional law into an “arbitrary
act of will.”166 Differently stated, we may rightly feel that it is unjust if
it were the simple personal preferences of the majority of the Court
that led it to conclude that, as a matter of constitutional law, the state’s
interest in protecting fetal life was weightier than a woman’s interest
in avoiding motherhood. However, we may not feel that such a
conclusion was unjust if an external scale of values led to the same
result. Yet, we are rarely apprised of the scale; we are infrequently
informed of how weights are assigned to interests. We must take a
leap of faith and hope the scale exists and that we are just not privy to
it. According to Aleinikoff:
[In] those cases in which the Court simply does not disclose
its source for the weights assigned to interests, [t]hese
balancing opinions are radically underwritten: interests are
identified and a winner is proclaimed or a rule is announced
which strikes an “appropriate” balance, but there is little
discussion of the valuation standards. Some rough, intuitive
scale calibrated in degrees of “importance” appears to be at

symposium at which he was speaking).
165
Justice Stevens noted this point in his concurrence in Casey. See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 914 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“Identifying the State’s interests — which the States rarely
articulate with any precision — makes clear that the interest in protecting potential
life is not grounded in the Constitution. It is, instead, an indirect interest supported by
both humanitarian and pragmatic concerns.”).
166
Aleinikoff, supra note 138, at 973.
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work. But to a large extent, the balancing takes place inside a
black box.167
We must either be optimistic about the existence of the scale, or we
may be pessimistic and assume that the scale is a fantasy — that it is
Justices’ personal preferences that determine the results of balancing
in any given case.168
The problem is especially acute in the area of compelling state
interests, as such interests by definition outweigh those rights that are,
at least as imagined, entitled to the most respect — fundamental
rights. If there is no theory guiding the Court in its determination that
a state interest is compelling, the Court is free to find compelling
interests wherever and whenever it pleases. The result is an end run
around fundamental rights, with individuals being stripped of the
guarantees contained in the Constitution.169 Moreover, if individual
rights are properly understood as constraints on government power,170
and individual fundamental rights are properly understood as
imperative constraints on government power, then stripping
individuals of their fundamental rights through unprincipled judicial
recognition171 of compelling state interests allows government power
to go unchecked. The need for a theory of compelling state interests is
then underscored. How does a judge or Justice determine that an
interest is compelling and that it is legitimately pursued to the

167

Id. at 976.
See id. (noting that, in the absence of substantive discussions of how interests
are balanced, the “specter” of judicial decision-making as an act of power and will is
raised).
169
See Gottlieb, Constitutional Discourse, supra note 152, at 549 (arguing that the
concept of compelling interests “is both powerful and dangerous because it justifies a
denial of protected rights and has often been used with that result”); Jed Rubenfeld,
On the Legal Status of the Proposition that “Life Begins at Conception”, 43 STAN. L. REV.
599, 603-04 (1991) (“On the whole, however, the compelling state interest doctrine
remains an unstructured balancing test in which our constitutional guarantees may
always give way to raisons d’état.”).
170
See Fallon, supra note 156, at 360 (“[R]ights sometimes derive from the interest
in preventing abuses of government power . . . .”).
171
It might be important to note that “unprincipled judicial recognition” of
compelling government interests is properly understood as a species of judicial
restraint — not judicial activism. Essentially, the judiciary defers to legislative
determinations of purposes that they may constitutionally pursue. See Gottlieb,
Constitutional Discourse, supra note 152, at 555 (noting that judicial restraint implies
“broad recognition of legislative powers” and “broad recognition of compelling
purposes”).
168

1326

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 46:1285

detriment of an individual’s fundamental right? The Court’s
jurisprudence offers no answer to the question.172
B. Abortion and the Problem of Governmental Interests, Compelling or
Otherwise
1.

A Compelling Governmental Interest in Protecting (Viable)
Fetal Life?

Considering the wealth of academic attention that has been given to
the Roe majority opinion over its twenty-eight years, it should be
unsurprising that Roe has been accused of being deficient in both
respects mentioned above. While a tidal wave of ink has been spilled
on the propriety of the Court’s conclusion that the Constitution is
properly interpreted to support a fundamental right to terminate a
pregnancy,173 reams of paper have been filled with debates concerning
the propriety of the Court’s conclusion that there exists a
governmental interest in protecting fetal life that is weighty enough, at
the point of fetal viability, to abridge the woman’s right to an
abortion.174 Blackmun, writing for the Court, offered viability as the
point at which the presumably always extant state interest in
172
Accordingly, many have attempted to rise to the challenge, offering principles
to guide the Court in its determination of whether or not a proffered state interest is
compelling. Some have argued that interests are compelling when they are necessary
to preserve the democratic state or the rule of law. See David Charles Sobelsohn, Of
Interests Fundamental and Compelling: The Emerging Constitutional Balance, 57 B.U. L.
REV. 462, 479 (1977) (arguing that “simple linguistic analysis” leads one to conclude
that a “compelling state interest” is one that is so paramount that “a threat to it not
only suggests, but actually compels government action” and that “[o]nly the interest of
self-preservation can be so strong”); cf. Linde, supra note 154, at 726 (“[T]he word
‘compelling’ denotes compulsion; one should not use ‘compelling’ if one does not
mean compulsion.”). Others have asserted that interests are compelling when they
advance the individual right that they would infringe. See Bhagwat, supra note 160, at
340. Others still have argued that interests are compelling when they protect life,
liberty, or property or advance equality. See Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental
Interests, supra note 160, at 939 (“It is reasonable to contend that the same solicitude
for life, liberty, and property that underlies the due process clause should underlie
respect for legislative efforts to protect life, liberty, and property by other means and
in other circumstances . . . . A fourth right that might serve as the justification for a
compelling governmental interest is the obligation of equality, which is explicitly
developed in five amendments.”).
173
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
174
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973) (holding that the state has an
“important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life” and
that this interest becomes compelling, and capable of overriding the pregnant
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy, at viability).
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protecting fetal life becomes compelling because it is then that the
fetus “has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s
womb.”175 However, as many have noted, Blackmun here does not give
a particularly convincing explanation as to why the state’s interest
becomes compelling at viability (as opposed to other stages of a
pregnancy, like conception, quickening, or birth); instead, he merely
defines viability.176
Much of the critique of Roe’s determination that the state’s interest
in protecting fetal life becomes compelling at fetal viability is not
generally due to the belief that a compelling state interest should not
have been found at that point, thereby allowing the individual’s right
to an abortion to remain unfettered subsequent to fetal viability.
Instead, the critique often comes from those who are also critical of
the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution to support an individual
right to an abortion — especially the relatively expansive one that
Blackmun’s majority opinion in Roe provided. Cases decided
subsequent to Roe gave Justices opportunities to articulate their sense
of the arbitrariness of Roe’s determination that the state’s interest in
protecting life becomes compelling at viability. Just sixteen years after
Roe, the Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (upholding
various regulations that functioned to limit the availability of abortion
services)177 would write, “[W]e do not see why the State’s interest in
protecting potential human life should come into existence only at the
point of viability, and there should therefore be a rigid line allowing
state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability.”178

175

Id. at 163.
See Aleinikoff, supra note 138, at 976 (arguing that Blackmun’s defense of
viability as the point at which the state’s interest in protecting fetal life becomes
compelling “is a definition of viability, not an explanation of value”); Ely, supra note
11, at 924 (“Exactly why that is the magic moment is not made clear . . . . [T]he
Court’s defense seems to mistake a definition for a syllogism.”).
177
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 522 (1989).
178
Id. at 519; see also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 795 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (“The State’s interest is in the fetus as
an entity in itself, and the character of this entity does not change at the point of
viability under conventional medical wisdom. Accordingly, the State’s interest, if
compelling after viability, is equally compelling before viability.”); City of Akron v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“[P]otential life is no less potential in the first weeks of pregnancy than it is at
viability or afterward . . . . The choice of viability as the point at which the state
interest in potential life becomes compelling is no less arbitrary than choosing any
point before viability or any point afterward.”) (emphasis in original).
176
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A Legitimate Governmental Interest in Protecting Fetal Life?

Then came Casey. And with Casey came the abandonment,
arguably, of the conceptualization of the abortion right as a
fundamental right179 — which, in turn, meant rejection of strict
scrutiny review of abortion regulations and the concomitant
irrelevance of inquiries into the compellingness of the state’s interest
in protecting fetal life. However, while Casey removed from the table
the question of when and why the Court ought to find that there exists
a compelling state interest in protecting fetal life sufficient to override
the fundamental individual right to abortion, another question moved
to the forefront: when and why should the Court find that there exists
a legitimate state interest in protecting fetal life sufficient to override
the individual liberty interest in abortion?
The interesting thing is that Casey did not have to defend its
determination that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting fetal
life; it could simply rely on the precedential value of Roe, which first
argued that the state has such an interest.180 However, unexplored
within the Roe decision was the question of whether the state’s interest
in protecting fetal life is a permissible one. Similar to the way that the
Court seemingly pulled from thin air viability as the point at which
the state’s interest becomes compelling, it seemingly pulled from thin
air the supposition that the state has an “important and legitimate
interest”181 in protecting fetal life.182 There was no theory of
compelling state interests to help the Court defend its finding of
viability as that transformative moment at which the state’s interest in
protecting fetal life became compelling. Similarly, there was no theory
of state interests to help the Court defend its finding that the state
even has a legitimate interest in “protecting the potentiality of fetal
life.”183
179

For a discussion of scholarship that maintains that the abortion right remains a
fundamental right that, quite anomalously, is not protected by strict scrutiny, see
supra note 110.
180
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (stating that the state has an
“important and legitimate interest” in protecting fetal life).
181
Id.
182
Cf. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 182 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the text of the Constitution provides no guidance to the
Court on how to discern what a “legitimate” state interest is, and concluding that the
concept is “an invitation for judicial exegesis over and above the commands of the
Constitution, in which values that cannot possibly have their source in that
instrument are invoked to either validate or condemn the countless laws enacted by
the various States”).
183
Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
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One could observe that, as a general principle of constitutional law,
a governmental interest is legitimate as long as it does not violate
another constitutional principle — like antidiscrimination184 or
economic anti-protectionism.185 The Court’s holdings also provide that
the “‘bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group[]’ [is] not
[a] legitimate state interest[].”186 It would follow that if the interest in
protecting fetal life violates no constitutional principle nor seeks to
harm a politically unpopular group, then it is legitimate — requiring
extensive interrogation by neither Roe nor Casey.
However, one can begin an answer to the claim that a governmental
interest in protecting fetal life violates no constitutional principle with
Justice Stevens’s observation in Casey that “in order to be legitimate,
the State’s interest must be secular; consistent with the First
Amendment the State may not promote a theological or sectarian
interest.”187 If the belief that the fetus is a potential life/unqualified
life/“life” is a theological claim, then the state’s interest in protecting it
may be illegitimate. Scholars, philosophers, ethicists, and jurists have
disagreed about how to answer this question.188 However, the question
184
See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (stating that catering to private
racial biases is not a legitimate governmental interest); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (stating that “[p]referring members of any one group
for no reason other than race or ethnic origin” is an impermissible state interest
because such preference constitutes “discrimination for its own sake”).
185
See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 106 (1994)
(“Our cases condemn as illegitimate, however, any governmental interest that is not
unrelated to economic protectionism . . . .”) (quotations omitted).
186
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)); see also Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 446-47 (1985).
187
Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 914 (1992) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
188
Compare Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 565-67 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that beliefs surrounding fetal life
necessarily have a “theological basis” with “no identifiable secular purpose”),
DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 155 (“We may describe most people’s beliefs about the
inherent value of human life — beliefs deployed in their opinions about abortion — as
essentially religious beliefs.”) (emphasis in original), LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE
CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 116 (1990) [hereinafter ABORTION] (arguing that “beliefs about
the point at which human life begins” have a “theological source”), and Laurence H.
Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law,” 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 21 (1973) [hereinafter Foreword] (arguing that a statement about fetal life
“entails not an inference . . . from generally shared premises, whether factual or moral,
but a statement of religious faith”), with TRIBE, ABORTION, supra, at 116 (“[A]s a matter
of constitutional law, a question such as this, having an irreducibly moral dimension,
cannot properly be kept out of the political realm merely because many religions and
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can remain unresolved because it is without a doubt that arguments
that the fetus is a potential life/unqualified life/“life” are moral
claims.189
3.

One Theory: The Illegitimacy of a Governmental Interest in
Protecting Fetal Life

Recent developments in constitutional law suggest that it may be
illegitimate for the state to use moral claims to constrain the ability of
a segment of society to live the lives that they want to live. The most
organized religious groups inevitably take strong positions on it.”). Nevertheless, it
seems patent that one can make an argument in favor of fetal “life” without
referencing religion. See, e.g., Sidney Callahan, Moral Duty to the Unborn and Its
Significance, in THE SILENT SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON THE UNBORN IN AMERICAN CULTURE
43, 49 (Brad Stetson ed., 1996) (“The unborn human being has value because it is a
member of the human family and shares in the heritage of the human species. The
human status and human potential of the dependent embryo deserve respect and
protection . . . . Is human life a gift which we accept gratefully? . . . A vision of human
bonding and the value of all the living urges us to answer yes.”) Justice White may
have articulated the secular basis for protecting fetal “life” most eloquently:
[O]ne must at least recognize, first, that the fetus is an entity that bears in its
cells all the genetic information that characterizes a member of the species
homo sapiens and distinguishes an individual member of that species from all
others, and second, that there is no nonarbitrary line separating a fetus from
a child or, indeed, an adult human being . . . . [T]he continued existence and
development — that is to say, the life — of such an entity are so directly at
stake in the woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy . . . .
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting).
189
See Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice and the American Constitution, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 133, 159 (1997) (describing beliefs about the fetus as “moral claims”). For
arguments that the belief that the fetus is a life is more of a religious than a moral
claim, see Ronald M. Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be
Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 414 (1992) (“[B]eliefs about the intrinsic
importance of human life are distinguished from more secular convictions about
morality, fairness, and justice.”); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Law
Making, 84 MICH. L. REV. 352, 379 (1985) (“If the moral status of the fetus and
desirable legal policy are not resolvable on rational grounds, individuals must decide
these questions on some nonrational basis. For many persons, the basis for judgment
is supplied in whole or part by religious perspectives, which either indicate the fetus’
moral status or gravely influence one’s mode of thinking about it.”); Sanger, supra
note 31, at 807 (stating that although the “life” referenced in the “culture of life”
“sounds secular enough . . . its rhetorical value is much enhanced by its association
with Christianity”); cf. Steven G. Gey, Is Moral Relativism a Constitutional Command?,
70 IND. L.J. 331, 340 (1995) (suggesting that some “moral regulations are essentially
religious in nature”).
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legible sign of this is Lawrence v. Texas, which struck down a Texas
statute criminalizing same-sex sodomy.190 The Court argued that
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, which
upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing all manner of sodomy,191 ought
to have been controlling.192 Justice Stevens contended that “the fact
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding
a law prohibiting the practice.”193 The Lawrence majority reformulated
the claim in the language of governmental interests: “The Texas
statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”194 In its
most expansive reading, Lawrence sounds the death knell for all
morals-based regulations.195 However, for many reasons, such a
reading is not very probable.196 More likely, Lawrence should be read
190
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (reversing the lower court’s decision to uphold the
statute).
191
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S.
558.
192
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
193
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
195
See id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that if the majority accepts Stevens’s
proposition that a state’s belief that a practice is immoral could never constitute a
legitimate state interest, then “[t]his effectively decrees the end of all morals
legislation”). It is worth observing that the Court’s movement from Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (which held that a state could prohibit public
nudity if it found the activity immoral) to City of Erie v. Pap’s, A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 291
(1999) (which held that a state could prohibit public nudity only if it found that
public nudity has negative “secondary effects”) suggests that we are entering a
jurisprudential period in which the state may not legitimately legislate morality.
196
See John Lawrence Hill, The Constitutional Status of Morals Legislation, 98 KY.
L.J. 1, 5 (2010) (“[R]ecent constitutional cases do not sound the death knell for most
forms of ‘morals legislation.’ It is well within the constitutional authority of the states
to achieve many, though not quite all, of the types of state interests traditionally
associated with the ‘moral function of law.’”); Eric A. Johnson, Habit and Discernment
in Abortion Practice: The Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 as Morals Legislation, 36
RUTGERS L.J. 549, 573 (2005) (arguing that many aspects of the majority in Lawrence
“leave open the possibility that indirect harm to persons or society could serve
adequately to justify morals legislation”); Gregory Kalscheur, S.J., Moral Limits on
Morals Legislation: Lessons for U.S. Constitutional Law from the Declaration on Religious
Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 7 (2006) (arguing that “explicit reliance on
moral rationales for law should not be banished altogether from the realm of
legitimate government interests”). But see Gey, supra note 189, at 331 (arguing that
“government policy must be premised primarily on some rationale other than
morality” in order to pass constitutional muster); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based
Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV.
1233, 1289 (2004) (“Whatever credibility the Court might have possessed previously
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to restrict the government’s ability to legislate morality when the
legislation demeans197 or could sanction discrimination against198 an
identifiable group in society. Stated differently, pursuit of a moral
conviction is an illegitimate state interest when the morals-based
regulation enacted in pursuit of the conviction would violate
principles of antidiscrimination. If this is a proper reading of
Lawrence, then there is an argument that regulations motivated by the
state’s interest in protecting pre-viable fetal life199 are illegitimate
inasmuch as they are based on a moral claim that has the effect of
demeaning or sanctioning discrimination against women. Women are
demeaned insofar as their decision-making capacities are called into
question by states that attempt to protect fetal life through the
informed consent process. Legislation that tries to convince a woman
that the moral status of the fetus that she carries demands the
continuation of the pregnancy ostensibly proceeds from the

to announce moral consensus on particular issues has slipped away entirely . . . . The
lack of an authoritative alternative to majoritarian preferences that could enable
meaningful, objective assessment of proposed moral justifications has reinforced, in
turn, the Court’s disinclination to rely on morality-based justification.”).
197
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (arguing that legislation that punishes sexual
activities in which gay persons engage “demeans the lives of homosexual persons”).
198
See id. (“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State,
that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”). For a similar reading
of Lawrence, see Johnson, supra note 196, at 566, which notes that part of the impetus
of the decision in Lawrence was the Court’s “recognition of the relationship between
sodomy laws and other forms of discrimination against gays and lesbians.”
199
The state may legitimately regulate abortions of viable fetuses because, although
the regulation remains based on a moral claim about the significance of the fetus at
that stage of development, and the state’s pursuit of the moral claim may compel
women to become mothers, a larger moral consensus has developed around the viable
fetus. Because there is a moral consensus that has developed around the viable fetus,
regulations of abortions of viable fetuses lose their cognizability as moral regulations.
Essentially, the logic is that, in the face of a moral consensus, a moral claim is less
cognizable as a moral claim; alternately, in the face of a moral dissensus, a moral claim
is more cognizable as a moral claim.
Consider murder. A law prohibiting murder might be based on a moral claim that it
is wrong to kill another person. However, that moral claim is less cognizable as a
moral claim in light of the moral consensus around the wrongfulness of killing others.
Compare this law with a law proscribing “homosexual sodomy.” Such a law might be
based on a moral claim that homosexual sodomy is wrong. Moreover, that moral claim
is highly cognizable as a moral claim in light of the moral dissensus around the
propriety of sexual relations between members of the same sex.
In light of this, because we do not witness the same moral consensus having
developed around the pre-viable fetus, then regulations of abortions of pre-viable
fetuses are properly recognized as moral regulation.
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assumption that women have not thought about the consequences of
their decisions to terminate their pregnancies.200 Moreover, moralsbased regulations enacted in pursuit of the state’s interest in protecting
fetal life sanction discrimination against women because, essentially,
they attempt to coerce women into becoming mothers. In this attempt,
they legitimize the belief that women are properly mothers — the
consummate stereotypical gender role.201 As such, these regulations
sanction discrimination against women who reject stereotypical
gender roles. In sum, the state’s interest in protecting fetal life may
function to demean and sanction discrimination against women,
making pursuit of its moral claim an illegitimate state interest,
consistent with the Court’s holding in Lawrence.
The uninterrogated assumption made in Roe that the state has a
legitimate interest in protecting fetal life has gradually transformed
with Carhart II into an assumption about the state’s interest in
protecting fetal “life.” Moreover, the thrust of this Article is to argue
that this assumption could ultimately prove fatal to the abortion right.
The advent of the protection of fetal “life” as a state interest
underscores the need for a developed theory of state interests. As this
Article will argue in the next Part, fetal “life” is such a momentous
proposition that, when a government pursues the protection of this
concept, it is implausible that any individual right or liberty will
outweigh it in a balancing test. The concept comes into being as the
gravest of propositions. Moreover, embedded within the very concept
of fetal “life” is its own vulnerability. Indeed, the concept presupposes
its own desperate need for protection. As both profoundly grave and
profoundly susceptible to destruction, fetal “life” necessarily defeats
rival concerns; certainly, the concerns that lead women to decide to
terminate a pregnancy, including her interest in safeguarding her
health,202 pale in comparison to the magnitude of fetal “life.” Should a
theory of state interests lead to the conclusion that the protection of
200
See Corbin, supra note 61, at 1010 (arguing that biased counseling laws insult
women as autonomous decision makers insofar as the state attempts to change their
minds about a decision that most women surely contemplate extensively before
making).
201
Cf. Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 265 (1992) (noting
that abortion restrictions embody and enact value judgments about the proper roles
that women can assume in society).
202
It bears noting that Professor Ely expressed skepticism that a woman’s interest
in her health ought to defeat the state’s interest in protecting fetal life. See Ely, supra
note 11, at 921 n.19 (arguing that Roe got it wrong when it held that there had to be
health and life exceptions to abortion prohibitions during the third trimester).
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fetal “life” is a valid pursuit of government, the abortion right would
have to reckon with its inevitable outweighing. However, a theory of
state interests would first have to declare the legitimacy of the
protection of fetal “life” as a goal of the state. Until such a theory is
developed, we ought to be skeptical of the advent of an interest that
functions to always and necessarily defeat a right once articulated as
fundamental.
IV. “LIFE” AND THE DEFEAT OF BALANCING TESTS
When the protection of fetal “life” is a governmental interest against
which any right or liberty is balanced, it most assuredly will be
deemed weightier than that against which it is balanced. Essentially,
the protection of fetal “life” will defeat a woman’s interest in terminating a
pregnancy under all balancing tests, from the undue burden standard to
strict scrutiny. “Life,” as culturally constructed, is such a weighty
proposition that it necessarily outweighs any individual right or
liberty.
A. The Present Undue Burden Standard
Under the present formulation of the undue burden standard, no
regulation passed in the pursuit of the protection of fetal “life” will be
found to be an unconstitutional undue burden on the abortion right.
This result occurs principally because the undue burden standard is a
balancing test, and fetal “life” is one of interests that must be balanced.
As discussed above,203 the standard is ostensibly an effects test that
requires a reviewing court to quantify the burden that a regulation
places upon the abortion right. If the court finds that the effect of the
law is unduly burdensome on abortion access, it must strike down the
law; alternately, if the court finds that the effect of the law is not
unduly burdensome, the law must be upheld. However, as observed,
the undue burden standard requires balancing, albeit implicitly. That
is, in arriving at the conclusion that the effect of the law is or is not
unduly burdensome, the judge tacitly balances the state’s interest in
protecting fetal “life” against the woman’s right.204 The result of that
balancing determines the result of the judge’s quantification of the
burden. If the interest in fetal “life” outweighs the abortion right, the
law’s effect on abortion access will not be found to be weighty enough
to constitute an undue burden. If the abortion right outweighs the
203
204

See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.C.
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interest in fetal “life,” the effect found will be sufficiently weighty to
constitute an undue burden.
Ultimately, as long as the standard is a balancing test, the results
will be the same. To put it simply, if fetal “life” is an element in a
balancing test, it will necessarily outweigh the competing interest
against which it is balanced. This is because fetal “life” is unmatched
in its profundity. Accordingly, it is impossible that those who believe
the fetus to embody “life” could find that any other pursuit outweighs
it. The woman’s interest in pursuing higher education or career
advancement, in averting enduring poverty, in extricating herself from
a physically or emotionally abusive relationship (or simply extricating
herself from an unfulfilling relationship), in continuing or changing
the trajectory her life has taken thus far, in avoiding the stigma of
single motherhood or welfare dependency, in avoiding being
physically harmed by continuing an otherwise wanted pregnancy,205 in
protecting her own life, etc. — all of these interests pale in comparison
to fetal “life.” “Life,” easily and necessarily, trumps all of these.
And this is precisely what the undue burden standard has yielded
since Carhart II’s implicit directive that governments may properly
pursue the protection of fetal “life” — and courts may recognize as
legitimate the government’s pursuit of the protection of fetal “life.”
Courts have had ample opportunity to demonstrate this aspect of the
undue burden standard insofar as there has been a deluge of
regulations passed by states that purport to further the interest in
protecting fetal “life.” These regulations take the form of fetal pain
laws,206 biased informed counseling laws,207 and ultrasound viewing

205

As noted above, Carhart II’s upholding of the federal PBA without a health
exception arguably signals the waning of the requirement in Roe and Casey that the
state’s pursuit of the protection of fetal life must yield to the woman’s interest in her
own health, if not her life. See discussion supra Part I.B.4.
206
Arizona, Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Utah have all passed laws that
require women to be told that their fetuses are capable of feeling pain. See State
Policies in Brief: An Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 1, 2013),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf.
207
See, e.g., L.B. 594, 101st Leg. 2d Sess (Neb. 2009), available at
http://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/101/PDF/Final/LB594.pdf (imposing onerous
informed consent requirements).
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laws.208 Moreover, they have been largely upheld when reviewed under
the undue burden standard.209

208

Twenty-one states have some kind of requirement with respect to viewing
ultrasounds, ranging from actually making the woman view the image to requiring the
physician to offer to display an ultrasound image. See State Policies in Brief:
Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST. (Dec. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf.
209
See Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed
Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 115 (2008)
(demonstrating that laws regarding information that must be given to a woman before
allowing her to obtain an abortion have generally been upheld when the court’s
analysis looks at burdens, though they sometimes are struck down under strict
scrutiny). Courts tend to reject facial challenges to informed counseling laws. See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 667-70 (8th Cir. 2011), vacated
in part on reh’g en banc, 662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2011), rev’d in part on reh’g en banc,
686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding that laws requiring doctors to inform a woman
that her fetus is a “living human being” and that she has a protected “relationship”
with the unborn child are not facially invalid since they do not cause undue burdens
in all cases). But see, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d
1048, 1063 (D.S.D. 2011) (granting a preliminary injunction against requirements
that a woman must get counseling from a “Pregnancy Help Center” before being
allowed to obtain an abortion in part because forcing a woman to disclose her decision
to an irrelevant third party is degrading); Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v.
Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1045 (D. Neb. 2010) (enjoining an informed
consent legislative bill that required doctors to preform extensive preabortion
assessments and subjected them to civil liability because it would have a chilling effect
of discouraging doctors from providing abortions, creating an undue burden and
depriving women of due process of law); Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman,
227 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1202 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (enjoining a law requiring informed
consent to women who had ectopic pregnancies or fetuses with lethal anomalies
because these women had no chance of successfully delivering a child so this
information was irrelevant). Laws requiring the presentation of medical information
are also usually upheld because courts do not find objectively truthful information to
be an undue burden. See, e.g., Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v.
Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577 (5th Cir. 2012) (arguing that medical information, such as a
sonogram, is not an undue burden because information regarding fetal development is
relevant to deciding whether or not to have an abortion and this information is
“inherently truthful and non-misleading”); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 492-93 (7th
Cir. 1999) (holding that laws requiring doctors to inform a woman that she had the
option to listen to the fetal heartbeat did not cause an undue burden because this is
truthful medical information). Critics of these laws feel that they do create an undue
burden because they serve as a lesson in morality to women and do not allow them to
opt out if they have already reached a decision. See Sarah E. Weber, Comment, An
Attempt to Legislate Morality: Forced Ultrasounds as the Newest Tactic in Anti-Abortion
Legislation, 45 TULSA L. REV. 359, 367-68 (2009) (arguing that forced viewing of an
ultrasound is an undue burden). But see Katherine E. Engelman, Fetal Pain Legislation:
Protection Against Pain is Not an Undue Burden, 10 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 279, 316
(2007) (arguing that fetal pain laws are necessary for the protection of unborn
children and that they merely serve to inform rather than to persuade).

2013]

“Life” in the Balance

1337

Essentially, the undue burden standard has been woefully unable to
protect the abortion right from nullification. This nullification,
moreover, is a product of the incorporation of fetal “life” into what is a
balancing test. The outcome will not be remedied until fetal “life” is
extracted from the test — until protecting fetal “life” is no longer an
interest that the state may legitimately pursue.
B. Strict Scrutiny
Some proponents of the abortion right have argued that the only
way to prevent it from being diminished by various forms of
incrementalist regulation is to recognize its fundamentality and to
protect it with nothing less than strict scrutiny.210 Their argument is
that strict scrutiny, and only strict scrutiny, is capable of striking
down regulations that restrict women’s access to abortion services.
However, strict scrutiny, like intermediate scrutiny and rational basis
review, is a balancing test.211 And the strength or efficacy of any
balancing test depends on the elements that are plugged into the test.
Moreover, when fetal “life” is plugged into the strict scrutiny test, the
test is rendered into any other balancing test that has been ineffective
at protecting a woman’s right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy.
The standard formulation of strict scrutiny is that a regulation
burdening a fundamental right will be struck down unless the state
can demonstrate that the law pursues a compelling interest. Moreover,
the means to pursuing that interest must be narrowly tailored to
accomplish the ends.212 There should be no doubt that protecting fetal
“life” would qualify as a “compelling” governmental interest. As this
Article has argued, “life” cannot be fairly described as anything but
compelling; thus, the protection thereof is one of the most compelling
activities that a government can undertake. Accordingly, the only
210
See e.g., Wharton et al., supra note 16, at 327-28 (discussing cases in which
abortion restrictions were reviewed with strict scrutiny under state constitutions, and
arguing that strict scrutiny, unlike the undue burden standard, offered robust
protection of abortion right by being able to strike down various incrementalist
regulations).
211
This Article strongly argues that strict scrutiny should be understood as a
balancing test — requiring courts to balance the weight of the fundamental right
against the weight of the state’s interest. Only a compelling state interest will be found
to outweigh a fundamental right. However, some disagree that strict scrutiny is
properly understood as a balancing test. See, e.g., FALLON, supra note 129, at 84
(arguing that strict scrutiny is not a balancing test because, “[e]ven if something
approaching the form of balancing is observed,” it is unhelpful to describe the test as
involving balancing because it is frequently “‘fatal in fact’”).
212
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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open inquiry for a reviewing court is whether the regulation is
narrowly tailored to accomplishing the protection of fetal “life.”
Skepticism should follow any assertion that a regulation would be
struck down on those grounds. Again, this is because of the nature of
“life.” Even the most unwieldy of regulations would likely be upheld
because of the profundity — and the profound vulnerability — of the
object being pursued.
CONCLUSION
Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu perhaps most eloquently described the
dialectical relationship between law and culture when he observed, “It
would not be excessive to say that [law] creates the social world, but
only if we remember that it is this world which first creates the law.”213
The advent of a state interest in the protection of fetal “life”
demonstrates the dialectical relationship between law and culture. The
notion of “life” is the product of many disparate and far-ranging
cultural practices. However, deserving at least some credit for its
development and for its saturation into culture — for its maturation
into something that is commonplace in the United States — is the law.
Specifically, the interpretation of the Constitution to support a
woman’s right to determine whether she will become a mother
provided fertile grounds for the development of a backlash. The
cultural concept of “life,” as the object of the abortion procedure, is
properly understood as part of the backlash. This Article has argued
that, with Carhart II, the cultural notion of “life” has become
embedded within law. And, Carhart II, as law, will undoubtedly spur
cultural responses. Therein lies the dialectical relationship between
law and culture.
It should come as no surprise that law produces culture and that
culture produces law. Law is, fundamentally, a cultural phenomenon.
However, more than merely reflecting the culture from which it
emerges, the law has been charged with the task of directing that
culture. Allowing the undue burden standard to become embedded
with “life” makes impossible the standard’s task of directing culture to
accommodate sometimes radically different perspectives on the fetus.
For those who believe that this accommodation is an essential
function of the Constitution, it is imperative that we recognize the
perversion of the undue burden standard and act to extract “life” from
this particular balancing test.
213
Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 805, 839 (1987) (emphasis removed).

